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Abstract
We provide two characterizations, one axiomatic and the other neuro-computational, of the de-
pendence of choice probabilities on deadlines, within the widely used softmax representation
pt (a;A) =
e
u(a)
(t)
+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
+(b)
where pt (a;A) is the probability that alternative a is selected from the set A of feasible alternatives
if t is the time available to decide,  is a time dependent noise parameter measuring the unit cost
of information, u is a time independent utility function, and  is an alternative-specic bias that
determines the initial choice probabilities and possibly reects prior information.
Our axiomatic analysis provides a behavioral foundation of softmax (also known as Multinomial
Logit Model when  is constant). Our neuro-computational derivation provides a biologically inspired
algorithm that may explain the emergence of softmax in choice behavior. Jointly, the two approaches
provide a thorough understanding of soft-maximization in terms of internal causes (neurophysiological
mechanisms) and external e¤ects (testable implications).
Keywords: Discrete Choice Analysis, Drift Di¤usion Model, Heteroscedastic Extreme Value Mod-
els, Luce Model, Metropolis Algorithm, Multinomial Logit Model, Quantal Response Equilibrium,
Rational Inattention
1 Introduction
Human decisions are often made under pressing deadlines that substantially a¤ect decision processes.
Think of a trader deciding among alternative investments in fast moving nancial markets, a triage nurse
screening patients in life threatening conditions, a soccer player under pressure choosing an action in a
split second. In all of these examples, the decision maker is given a constrained deliberation time to gather
and process noisy information about alternatives, whose nature he typically only imperfectly knows. This
binding constraint, with deliberation typically lasting till deadline, prevents the decision maker to fully
learn the nature of alternatives, so to discover his preference over them and select the best one. For this
reason, noise in information acquisition translates into stochastic choice behavior: when facing in di¤erent
occasions the same set of alternatives, the decision maker might well end up choosing di¤erently.
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In this paper we study stochastic choice behavior caused by time constrained information processing.
We focus on softmax probabilistic choices, the most classic stochastic choice specication, in which the
probability of choosing alternative a from a menu A is:
pt (a;A) =
e
u(a)
(t)
+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
+(b)
(1)
Here u (a) is the true, but unknown to the decision maker and to the analyst, subjective value of alternative
a,  (t) is the cost of processing one unit of information in t seconds, and  (a) is a behavioral initial bias
for alternative a, possibly due to past information. When the initial bias is absent, (1) reduces to a
multinomial logit specication. The initial bias determines choice behavior when there is no deliberation
time:1
p0 (a;A) = lim
t!0
pt (a;A) =
e(a)P
b2A e
(b)
At the opposite extreme, under unconstrained deliberation time the best alternatives are selected:
p1 (a;A) = lim
t!1
pt (a;A) > 0 () a 2 argmaxA u
as prescribed by standard ordinal utility analysis. In general, under constrained but non-zero deliberation
time, an intermediate stochastic behavior results, which gives, as deliberation time increases, a higher
chance in the sense of stochastic dominance of choosing better alternatives.
Mateijka and McKay (2015) have shown that softmax stochastic choice behavior arises when the
decision maker optimally processes information about u  the unknown state of nature  under an
entropic cost of information. Their study provides an important optimal information acquisition foundation
for softmax behavior. In this paper we study such behavior from two di¤erent, yet complementary,
viewpoints that integrate their analysis. First, we provide a framework for the external, behavioral, study
of an analyst who observes the choices of the decision maker and interprets them in the as ifmode of
revealed preference analysis, through behavioral axioms that characterize softmax stochastic behavior.
Second, we pursue an internal, neural, approach that provides a causal analysis of the decision maker
choices through a biologically inspired algorithmic decision process that may explain softmax emergence
in intelligent behavior and that naturally links multi-alternative choice with the classical di¤usion model
paradigm of binary choice.
These two complementary approaches provide, along with the Mateijka and McKay (2015) optimality
analysis, a complete perspective on softmaximization as a model of preference discovery,2 in terms of both
internal (neural) causes and external (behavioral) e¤ects. In particular, we address two key questions:
(i) Is the softmax model empirically testable, and can its parameters be identied by behavioral data?
(ii) Is this model plausible from a neural viewpoint?
This paper presents positive answers to both questions. More specically, in the rst part of the
paper (Sections 2 and 3) we address the rst question by carrying out an outside the black boxrevealed
preference analysis that leads to a representation theorem, Theorem 5, that axiomatizes the softmax model
(1). Our axioms form a set of necessary and su¢ cient testable implications of the model that allow the
analyst to falsify the model and, when not falsied, to elicit its parameters from behavioral data, as detailed
in Proposition 6. Estimation methods for this model are, instead, well established as the multinomial logit
model is widely used in discrete choice analysis.
1Formally,  (t)!1 (resp., 0) as t! 0 (resp. 1). Bias is absent when  is constant.
2That is, of the learning of the nature so, the subjective value of alternatives when information is costly.
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We complete our external analysis by showing that longer deliberation times rst-order stochastically
improve the chances of selecting better alternatives (Proposition 7). As deliberation time becomes innite,
best alternatives get selected (Proposition 8), thus recovering standard ordinal analysis as a limit case.
In the second part of the paper (Section 4) we address the second question by going inside the black
boxthrough a computational neuroscience approach. We develop an algorithmic decision process that,
when implemented by the neural system, generates the softmax stochastic choice behavior described in
equation (1). This process is inspired by eye-tracking evidence and combines Markov exploration as in
Metropolis et al. (1953) and the drift di¤usion model of binary choice of Racli¤ (1978), in the value-based
version proposed by Krajbich, Armel and Rangel (2010) and Milosavljevic et al. (2010). Moreover, it
approximately generates softmax stochastic choice as observable exterior output (Proposition 12), thus
providing a neural foundation for softmax choice behavior. We also present physiologically-calibrated
simulations that support the biological plausibility of this neural foundation (Section 4.6).
The rst two parts of the paper show that, jointly, the inner and outer approaches provide a thorough
understanding of softmaximization in terms of internal causes (neurophysiological mechanisms) and exter-
nal e¤ects (testable implications). In the nal part of the paper (Section 5), we show that their cause-e¤ect
nexus actually permits to identify and cross-validate the components of the behavioral and neural softmax
specications. This empirical dividend of our inner-outer analysis concludes our exercise.
Discrete choice analysis A by-product of our analysis is an axiomatic foundation of the heteroscedastic
multinomial logit model, the workhorse of discrete choice analysis.3 Indeed, (1) can be rewritten in terms
of random utility (see Luce and Suppes, 1965, and McFadden, 1973) as
pt (a;A) = Pr fu (a) +  (t)  (a) > u (b) +  (t)  (b) for all b 2 A n fagg
where f (a)ga2A is a collection of independent errors with type I extreme value distribution, specic mean
 (a), and common variance 2=6. Here pt (a;A) describes the stochastic behavior of a decision maker
who is trying to maximize u but, because of time pressure, makes mistakes in evaluating the various
alternatives. The standard deviation of mistakes is proportional to  (t) and their bias is captured by
. In discrete choice analysis, t may be time or, more in general, an index describing the experimental
conditions under which data have been collected (that is, the di¤erent data sets available to the analyst).4
Heteroscedasticity, i.e., the dependence of  on t and the presence of , was introduced because, while
the decision makersutility u is a stable trait to be learned, disturbances are a¤ected by experimental
conditions and alternative specic biases.
The present paper permits to test for mis-specication of the heteroscedastic multinomial logit model
and provides simple techniques to directly identify its parameters from data. In return, as previously
mentioned, the discrete choice analysis literature provides a number of methods to estimate the parameters
of the softmax specication (1).5
Related literature This paper considers exogenous deliberation times, thus we focus our discussion on
the literature dealing with this issue.6 To the best of our knowledge, there is only one other axiomatic
3See, e.g., the textbooks of Louviere, Hensher and Swait (2000) and Train (2009).
4For example, T is a set of locations in Train (2009, pp. 24-25), it is a doubleton distinguishing between stated intentions
and market choices in Ben-Akiva and Morikawa (1990). In Appendix D, we extend our axiomatic analysis to allow for
completely general choice and index sets.
5The econometric study of the heteroscedastic multinomial logit model, now textbook material, dates back to Ben-Akiva
and Morikawa (1991), Swait and Louviere (1993), Hensher and Bradley (1993) and Bhat (1995).
6Models where decision time is endogenously  say, optimally chosen are the subject of active research and we refer
readers to Woodford (2014), Tajima, Drugowitsch and Pouget (2016), Steiner, Stewart and Matejka (2017), Fudenberg,
Strack and Strzalecki (2018), Callaway, Rangel and Gri¢ ths (2019), Tajima, Drugowitsch, Patel and Pouget (2019), Webb
(2019), and Jang, Sharma and Drugowitsch (2020) for updated perspectives.
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foundation of the softmax model based on choice frequencies, due to Matejka and McKay (2015). The
main di¤erence is that they assume that the analyst knows the state that determines the decision makers
utility,7 while we consider the general case in which the analyst may possibly ignore this state, or even the
state space. Outside the laboratory, presuming such knowledge is a quite strong assumption. For example,
what is the relevant state in the following simple vending machine value-based task?
In a general Random Expected Utility perspective, Lu (2016) axiomatically captures preference learning
through increasingly informative priors on the set of probabilistic beliefs of the decision maker. Fudenberg
and Strzalecki (2015) axiomatize a discounted adjusted logit model. Di¤erently from the present work, their
paper studies stochastic choice in a dynamic setting where choices made today can inuence the possible
choices available tomorrow, and consumption may occur in multiple periods. Frick, Iijima and Strzalecki
(2017) characterize the general random utility counterpart. Saito (2017) obtains several characterizations
of the Mixed Logit Model. Finally, Baldassi et al. (2019) and Fudenberg, Newey, Strack and Strzalecki
(2019) axiomatize the value-based DDM.
As to algorithmic random choice theory, the vast majority of the multi-alternative extensions of the
DDM to choice tasks with N > 2 alternatives considers simultaneous evidence accumulation for all the
N alternatives in the menu. In these models, the choice task is assumed to simultaneously activate N
accumulators, each of them is primarily sensitive to one of the alternatives and integrates the evidence
relative to that alternative. Choices are then made based on absolute or relative evidence levels, with
endogenous or exogenous stopping times. See, e.g., Roe, Busemeyer and Townsend (2001), Anderson,
Goeree and Holt (2004), McMillen and Holmes (2006), Bogacz, Usher, Zhang and McClelland (2007),
Ditterich (2010) and Krajbich and Rangel (2011). Natenzon (2019) also belongs to this family and proposes
a Multinomial Bayesian Probit model to jointly accommodate similarity, attraction and compromise e¤ects
in a preference learning perspective. According to Natenzons model, when facing a menu of alternatives
the decision maker who has a priori i.i.d. standard normally distributed beliefs on the possible utilities of
alternatives receives a random vector of jointly normally distributed signals that represents how much he
is able to learn about the ranking of alternatives before making a choice (say within time t). The decision
maker updates the prior according to Bayesrule and chooses the option with the highest posterior mean
utility.
Alternatively, Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer and Rangel (2011) propose three two-stage models in which
subjects randomly search through the feasible set during an initial search phase, and when this phase
7Choice situations of this kind have been studied since Saltzman and Garner (1948) and Kaufman, Lord, Reese and
Volkmann (1949). More recent contributions are Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche and Weinberg (2006), Caplin and Dean (2014),
Dean and Neligh (2019) and Dewan and Neligh (2020).
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is concluded they select the best item that was encountered during the search, up to some noise. This
approach involves what may be called a quasi-exhaustive search in that the presence of a deadline may
terminate the search phase before all alternatives have been evaluated and introduces an error probability.
In contrast, this paper focuses on sequential pairwise comparison, as advocated by Russo and Rosen
(1975) in a seminal eye xation study. Although di¤erent from the models considered by Krajbich and
Rangel (2011) and Reutskaja, Nagel, Camerer and Rangel (2011), our model is consistent with some of their
experimental ndings about the menu-exploration process and shares the reliance on the classical choice
theory approach in which multi-alternative choice proceeds through binary comparison and elimination.
Rustichini and Padoa-Schioppa (2015) extend the DDM in a biologically realistic model by adopting
models developed in visual perception to economic choices. Rustichini et al. (2017) uses this model to
explain optimality properties of adaptive coding in choice.
2 Stochastic choice and psychometric utilities
2.1 Preamble: Random choice rules
Let A be the collection of all nonempty nite subsets A of a universal set X of possible alternatives, called
menus.8 We denote by (X) the set of all nitely supported probability measures on X and, for each
A  X, by (A) the subset of (X) consisting of the measures assigning mass 1 to A.
Denition 1 A random choice rule is a function
p : A ! (X)
A 7! pA
such that pA 2 (A) for all A 2 A.
Given any alternative a in A, we interpret pA (fag), also denoted by p (a;A), as the probability that a
decision maker chooses a when the set of available alternatives is A. More generally, if B is a subset of A,
we denote by pA (B) or p (B;A) the probability
P
b2B p (b; A) that the selected element lies in B.
9 This
probability can be viewed as the frequency with which an element in B is chosen.
As usual, given any a and b in X, we set
p (a; b) = p (a; fa; bg) ; r (a; b) = p (a; b)
p (b; a)
; ` (a; b) = ln r (a; b) (2)
Thus r (a; b) denotes the odds for a against b, that is, the ratio between the number of episodes in which
a is chosen and the number of episodes in which b is. Its logarithm ` (a; b) denotes the log-odds, which are
analytically convenient because they are positive if and only if odds are favorable to a.10
Luce (1959) proposes the most classical random choice model. Its assumptions on p are:
Positivity p (a; b) > 0 for all a; b 2 X.
Choice Axiom p (a;A) = p (a;B) p (B;A) for all B  A in A and all a 2 B.
8Or choice sets or choice problems. We also assume, that X has at least three elements since the two remaining cases are
simple exercises.
9Formally, x 7! p (x;A), for all x in X, is the discrete density of pA, but notation will be abused and pA () identied with
p (; A).
10Indeed, p (a; b)  p (b; a) () r (a; b)  1 () ` (a; b)  0.
5
The latter axiom says that the probability of choosing an alternative a from menu A is that of rst
selecting B from A and then a from B. As observed by Luce, this amounts to require that fpA : A 2 Ag
is a conditional probability system in the sense of Renyi (1955).11
As well-known, both axioms can be expressed in terms of odds. In particular, the Choice Axiom is
equivalent to the odds independence condition, p (a; b) =p (b; a) = p (a;A) =p (b; A) when p (a;A) =p (b; A) is
well dened, that the odds for a against b be independent of the other alternatives available in the menu.12
Next we state Luces classic representation theorem.
Theorem 1 (Luce) The following conditions are equivalent for a random choice rule p : A ! (X):
1. p satises Positivity and the Choice Axiom;
2. there exists v : X ! R such that
p (a;A) =
ev(a)P
b2A e
v(b)
(3)
for all A 2 A and all a 2 A.
In this case, v is unique up to location (i.e., up to an additive constant).
Moreover, when X is a topological space, it is easy to see that the next axiom characterizes the
continuity of the function v that appears in (3).
Continuity The function (a; b) 7! p (a; b) is continuous on the set of all pairs of distinct alternatives in
X.
This topological setting is standard in applications, where typically Continuity is either implicitly
assumed or automatically satised.13 Finally, observe that Theorem 1 shows that Positivity is equivalent,
under the Choice Axiom, to the stronger assumption that pA has full support for each A in A.14
2.2 Preference discovery: intuition
In our preamble we have considered a single random choice rule: this is the setup of the classical stochastic
choice as in, for example, Debreu (1958). We now provide the intuition for the extension of p to a family
of such rules, pt, where the index t models the e¤ects of the discovery process. We will illustrate three
stages in such process. The rst stage, corresponding to t = 0, is illustrated by a decision maker who has
11See Lemma 2 of Luce (1959) for the case in which Positivity holds and our Lemma 14 in Appendix A for the general
case.
12This odds independence condition is often called independence from irrelevant alternatives. See Lemma 3 of Luce (1959)
for the case in which Positivity holds and our Lemma 14 in Appendix A for the general case.
13Also this continuity axiom can be expressed in terms of odds (see Lemma 13 in Appendix A).
14In Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2016), we drop the full support assumption and characterize
general random choice rules in terms of optimalityof their support (see Theorem 15 in Appendix A).
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to choose one of the following alternatives, each identied by a QR code:15
? ?
? ?
If the decision maker chooses alternative a, he receives a number of euros (or apple juice drops) equal to
the number of black squares n (a) present in QR code a.
Our decision maker is greedyand so prefers more euros (or apple juice) to less:
a  b () n (a) > n (b)
A utility function that represents  has thus the form u =   n, where  : N! R is strictly increasing.
If the decision maker has deliberated long enough (so t = 1) we may suppose that he knows the
correct number of black squares n (a) of each alternative, as indicated in gure:
229 242
232 248
This knowledgeable decision maker selects the best alternative, which in the gure has 248 black squares.
His choice behavior is thus non-stochastic and reveals only his preference order, his ranking of alternatives.
Even if the decision maker experienced di¤erent intensities of preferences over di¤erent pairs of alternatives,
his choice behavior would not reveal anything about them to the analyst, an external observer. In other
words, intensities are irrelevant to model his choice behavior. This is, for instance, the standard setting
of consumer theory since the ordinal revolution started by Vilfredo Pareto (who rst understood this
irrelevance).
Matters are di¤erent in the third stage, intermediate to the rst two we have considered. Suppose
that, perhaps because of time pressure (or cognitive limitations), the decision maker does not know n (a),
so he is unable to properly evaluate alternatives, and only receives a possibly costly noisy signal about
it. For instance, knowing that he can deliberate for t seconds only,16 the decision maker might use this
15Each code has 441 = 21 21 white or black squares.
16Throughout the paper we take seconds as the units of time.
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limited time to randomly extract four squares from each QR code, and observe whether they are back or
white:17
       
       
After deliberation, the decision maker has to choose an alternative. Because of the signals noise, his
choice is now stochastic and he might well end up selecting a sub-optimal alternative.18 Interestingly, the
stochastic choice behavior that emerges in this, informationally poorer, setting may reveal information on
preference intensities.
Intuitively, this happens because the intensity of preference a¤ects the error probability, that is, the
chance of selecting a sub-optimal alternative after deliberation. Indeed, the stronger the preference for a
over b, the easier their comparison, so the smaller the probability of choosing the inferior b. The intensity
of preference, which plays no role in the choice behavior of a decision maker who knows his subjective
value of alternatives, becomes important to understand his stochastic choice behavior when he ignores
such value and receives only noisy evidence about it. In turn, by a¤ecting choice probabilities, preference
intensities leave a trace in the decision maker choice behavior that an analyst may exploit to elicit them.
This preference discovery intuition is an information acquisition elaboration of a classic discrimination
principle of psychophysics, discussed for example in Davidson and Marschak (1959, p. 237). Some recent
work of Alos-Ferrer, Fehr and Netzer (2018) and de Palma, Fosgerau, Melo and Shum (2019) may help to
better understand this elaboration. The latter paper, for instance, shows that, when the information cost
belongs to a large class of entropies, choice probabilities implied by optimal information acquisition take
the form of an additive random utility. In this case, after acquiring information optimally for t seconds,
the decision maker chooses a over b with probability
pt (a; b) = Pr

u (a) + at > u (b) + 
b
t
	
= Pr

bt   at < u (a)  u (b)
	
The error probability that is, the probability of choosing b when u (a) > u (b) decreases as the di¤erence
u (a)  u (b), interpreted as preference intensity, increases.
2.3 Psychometric utilities
The previous discussion motivates us to go beyond the traditional ordinal setting, where preferences only
rank alternatives, and to introduce a richer setting in which we can also talk about preference intensities
and their utility representations.
17The outcome of this procedure is stochastic, but depends on the correct state (e.g., the probability of extracting a black
square from the North-Western QR code is 229/441).
18For example, our experiment leads to a mistake: the sub-optimal South-Western square is chosen, with a material loss
of 16 euros (or apple juice drops).
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To this end, we consider three strict preference relations , \ and .19 In particular,  is dened
on the set of alternatives X and ranks them
a  b
while \ is dened on the set of distinct pairs of alternatives X26= = f(a; b) : a 6= b in Xg and ranks them
(a; b) \ (c; d)
Finally,  is dened on the set of binary choice sets A2 = ffa; bg : a 6= b in Xg and ranks them
fa; bg  fc; dg
In terms of interpretation,  is a standard preference relation that ranks alternatives a la Debreu (1954,
1964), \ ranks pairs of alternatives in terms of intensity of preference, a la Shapley (1975), and  ranks
choice problems in terms of ease of comparison, a la Suppes and Winet (1955). Indeed, a decision maker
might well regard some comparisons as easier to make than others.
Next we introduce a joint numerical representation of these three binary relations that extends the
traditional ordinal representation.
Denition 2 A function u : X ! R is a psychometric utility (function) for the triplet  ;\; if, for
each pair of alternatives a; b 2 X,
a  b() u(a) > u(b) (4)
and if, for each quadruple of alternatives a 6= b and c 6= d in X,
(a; b) \ (c; d)() u(a)  u(b) > u (c)  u (d) (5)
as well as
fa; bg  fc; dg () ju(a)  u(b)j > ju (c)  u (d)j (6)
A psychometric utility does not only represent the basic preference  in the standard ordinal fashion,
but also accounts for the intensity of preferences, quantied via utility di¤erences, as well as, for the ease
of comparison, quantied via absolute values of utility di¤erences.
Psychometric utilities are cardinal, as the next routine lemma shows.
Lemma 2 Continuous psychometric utilities, dened on connected topological spaces, are cardinally unique.
The basic intuition previously outlined suggests that stochastic choice behavior might be understood in
terms of psychometric utilities. Our softmax representation theorem (Theorem 5) will show that, indeed,
this is the case. In turn, stochastic choice behavior can be then used to elicit psychometric utilities. The
next section introduces the measurement concepts to accomplish this elicitation.
Before doing this, we make a nal important remark. Conceptually, the representations (4)-(6) capture
di¤erent important features of the decision makers subjective evaluations of alternatives. Yet, though
distinct, they are not independent. Intuitively, the decision maker should nd easier  say in terms of
mental e¤ort (for instance, to retrieve past memories) to rank alternatives over which he feels a stronger,
more intense, preference, with one alternative being clearly more desirable than the other. Proposition
17 in Appendix B claries by establishing when representations (4)-(6) hold the existence of a duality
map that associates to each pair (;) a relation \ and vice versa. We can diagram the duality as
(;) D \
RR R\
(;) D
 1
 \
(7)
19Strict preference relations are asymmetric and negatively transitive (see, e.g., Denition 2.2 of Kreps, 1988).
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where R, R and R\ denote the sets of strict preferences on X, A2 and X26=, respectively.
In view of this duality, in principle one can focus on either (;) or \ and derive the properties
of the other via the duality. We nevertheless consider them together, as a triple
 ;\;, because
as previously remarked they shed light on di¤erent features of decision makerssubjective evaluations of
alternatives albeit logically connected when they admit utility representations (4)-(6). Yet, this duality
is an important structural property that later will emerge in our analysis, in particular in the structure of
the softmax representation theorem (Theorem 5).
3 Outside the black box: Softmax axiomatization
3.1 Measurement and revelations
How can an analyst detect and measure the intensitytraces left by the stochastic choice behavior of the
decision maker? The new element that we have introduced is a family of random choice rules, rather than
a single one, and the crucial assumptions that permit to address this question concern the way in which
they move as t changes. To this end, observe that a random choice rule can represent both the outcome
of deliberation and the initial bias of a decision maker. Suppose he is comparing two distinct alternatives
a and b. The initial probability
p0 (a; b)
describes the frequency with which a is chosen over b, before any evidence-based deliberation. Alternatives
a and b are a priori homogeneous if p0 (a; b) = 1=2, that is, if there is no initial bias for one over the other.
Now assume that, after presentation of the choice problem fa; bg, the decision maker is (exogenously)
given the possibility to deliberate for t seconds by acquiring and processing information about the alterna-
tives. Depending on the evidence that he is able to gather, be it from environment or memory (or both),20
the choice probability
pt (a; b)
at deliberation time t may well be di¤erent from the initial one p0 (a; b).21 We interpret this change in
light of the following basic principle.
Measurement Principle Prior behavior gets transformed to posterior behavior through consideration of
evidence, and the transformation itself represents the amount of evidence processed during deliberation.
This principle is best formalized through a change in odds as:
rt (a; b)| {z }
posterior odds
= f|{z}
strength of evidence
 r0 (a; b)| {z }
prior odds
(8)
The ratio
f = ft (a; b) =
rt (a; b)
r0 (a; b)
represents the strength of evidence, gathered in t seconds, in favor of the hypothesis a is preferable to b.
That said, in both statistics and neuroscience additive measurements are preferred,22 here routinely
achieved by taking logarithms on both sides of (8):
`t (a; b)| {z }
posterior log-odds
= ln ft (a; b)| {z }
weight of evidence
+ `0 (a; b)| {z }
prior log-odds
20See, e.g., Bogacz et al. (2006), Gold and Shadlen (2007), and Shadlen and Shohamy (2016).
21See, e.g., Huseynov, Krajbich, and Palma (2018).
22See, again, Gold and Shadlen (2007).
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The di¤erence
wt (a; b) = ln ft (a; b) = `t (a; b)  `0 (a; b)
is the additive version of ft (a; b), called weight of evidence, a convenient logarithmic rescaling of strength
of evidence.
Summing up, the strength of evidence is the change in odds for a against b induced by evidence
accumulation for t seconds. This important notion permits to introduce three revealed preferences that
correspond to the three strict preferences
 ;\; that capture, as previously argued, some key features
of the decision maker subjective evaluations of alternatives.
We begin with the traditional ordinal notion. As usual, in the following revealedis short for revealed
to an analyst.
Denition 3 After a deliberation time t, an alternative a is revealed preferred to b, written a t b, if
pt (a; b) > p0 (a; b).
In words, a is revealed preferred to b if deliberation favors a over b. In particular, when alternatives are a
priori homogeneous, i.e., p0 (a; b) = 1=2, this denition coincides with the standard notion of stochastically
revealed preference
a t b () pt (a; b) > pt (b; a)
which has informed economics and psychology since the 1950s.23
In general, when alternatives are not necessarily a priori homogeneous, preference for a over b is
equivalently revealed by an increase in the odds for a against b after deliberation, in fact,
a t b () wt (a; b) > 0 () ft (a; b) > 1
Starting from this observation, Luce (1957, pp. 17-19) observes that, while the preference order is deter-
mined by the sign of wt (a; b), the preference intensity is determined by its value. This motivates the next
denition.
Denition 4 After a deliberation time t, the preference for a over b is revealed to be stronger than that
for c over d, written (a; b) \t (c; d), if wt (a; b) > wt (c; d).
In words, the preference for a over b is stronger than that for c over d if deliberation provides stronger
evidence in favor of a against b than in favor of c against d. This denition thus equates strength of
preference and strength of evidence, a key revelation assumption. Formally,
(a; b) \t (c; d) () wt (a; b) > wt (c; d) () ft (a; b) > ft (c; d)
While the preference order t is a relation between single alternatives, preference intensity \t is a relation
between pairs of alternatives.
The next and nal relation t is dened over binary decision problems fa; bg and is meant to represent
their relative di¢ culty. It relies upon the following classic principle of psychophysics.
Psychometric Principle Easier choice problems are more likely to elicit correct responses than harder
ones.24
23See, e.g., Georgescu-Roegen (1936, 1958), Mosteller and Nogee (1951), Papandreou (1953, 1957), Quandt (1956), Debreu
(1958), and Davidson and Marschack (1959).
24This principle is often discussed under the name Psychometric Function. See, e.g., Alos-Ferrer, Fehr, and Netzer
(2018).
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In a series of important works,25 Georg Rasch formalizes this principle through the concept of degree
of easiness of a decision problem fa; bg, given by
et (a; b) = jwt (a; b)j
The reason why this quantity captures the psychometric principle is immediately seen by drawing the error
rate the probability of choosing the inferior alternative in the decision problem fa; bg as a function of
the degree of easiness:
0 2 4 6 8 10
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Degree of easiness
Error rate
When the degree of easiness is zero, the error rate is maximal and coincides with the initial probability
of choosing the inferior alternative. It then decreases exponentially as the degree of easiness increases, and
eventually vanishes.
Since wt (a; b) =  wt (b; a), the evidence in favor of a coincides with that against b. The degree of
easiness thus represents the total amount of evidence jwt (a; b)j that can be obtained by comparing a and
b for t seconds. A decision problem is di¢ cult when this quantity is small, say because sensory evidence
or memory do not provide information to the decision maker about the alternatives. All this leads to the
following denition.
Denition 5 After a deliberation time t, a decision problem fa; bg is revealed to be easier than a decision
problem fc; dg, written fa; bg t fc; dg, if et (a; b) > et (c; d).
This denition equates ease of comparison with the absolute amount of evidence that can be obtained
through deliberation, in fact,
fa; bg t fc; dg () jwt (a; b)j > jwt (c; d)j (9)
Summing up, strength of evidence or, equivalently, weight of evidence can be elicited from choice
data by looking at the variation of choice probabilities before and after deliberation. It reveals three
relations: preference order, preference intensity, and ease of comparison.
3.2 Random choice processes
Let X be a topological space and T  (0;1) a discrete or continuous nonempty set of points of time.
We set T0 = T [ f0g.
Denition 6 A random choice process is a collection fptgt2T0 of random choice rules.
25See Rasch (1960, 1961, 1980).
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For each t, we interpret pt (a;A) as the probability that a decision maker chooses alternative a from
menu A if t is the deliberation time, that is, the maximum amount of time he is (exogenously) given to
decide.26 A random choice process thus describes the decision maker stochastic choice behavior under
di¤erent deliberation times.
Each component pt of a random choice process stochastically reveals (to an analyst), via Denitions
3-5, a triplet (t;\t;t ) for each t 2 T . We say that u : X ! R is a psychometric utility for process fptg
if it is a psychometric utility for all triplets (t;\t;t ) that the process reveals over di¤erent deliberation
times, that is, if for any a; b 2 X,
a t b() u(a) > u(b)
and, for any a 6= b and c 6= d in X,
(a; b) \t (c; d)() u(a)  u(b) > u (c)  u (d)
as well as
fa; bg t fc; dg () ju(a)  u(b)j > ju (c)  u (d)j
for all t 2 T .
We adopt a preference discovery interpretation. As previously outlined, the psychometric utility u
represents the correct value that alternatives have for the decision maker, a trait of his tastes which is
stable (so, independent of t) and unknown to him yet. During deliberation, the decision maker processes
noisy evidence about u. Evidence may be costly (say in subjective terms, like fatigue), so the decision
maker confronts an information acquisition problem. After deliberation, he has to choose an alternative.
Noise in information gathering and processing makes stochastic the ensuing choice behavior, which the
psychometric utility determines only probabilistically.27
The most important class of random choice processes describing a stochastic choice behavior which
is consistent, as Matejka and McKay (2015) have shown, with the preference discovery interpretation we
maintained so far is that of softmax random choice processes:
Denition 7 A random choice process fptg is softmax if there exist a payo¤ u : X ! R, an (initial
behavioral) bias  : X ! R, and a noise  : T ! (0;1), extended to T0 by  (0) =1, such that
pt (a;A) =
e
u(a)
(t)
+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
+(b)
(10)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T0.
Next we clarify the utility nature of the payo¤.
Proposition 3 If fptg is a softmax random choice process, then the payo¤ (function) u in (10) is a
psychometric utility for fptg.
26Say, by an experimenter, a script, or a spouse (see Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman, 2015, for a simple protocol that
allows to observe these probabilities for human agents). An alternative interpretation of t, especially relevant when T is
discrete and panel data are considered, is the number of times that the decision maker has been facing choice problem A,
called experience level by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). On this, see also Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 332).
27To illustrate, in the QR code example (Section 2.2) the agent knows that he prefers more (money or apple juice) to less,
but does not know the correct vector (n (a) ; n (b) ; n (c) ; n (d)) = (229; 242; 232; 248) of physical payo¤s (in euros or drops)
associated with alternatives. This vector determines the correct subjective value u =   n of alternatives, the unknown
statethat determines the distribution of signals that the decision maker obtains through experimentation, both when he
tries to count the number of black squares or when he randomly extracts four squares from each code. In both cases the
state is revealed only stochastically (three research assistants, asked to count the squares within ten minutes, obtained three
di¤erent vectors).
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Besides a psychometric utility u, the softmax specication features two other key elements, bias 
and noise . Before discussing the roles of these functions within a preference discovery interpretation of
stochastic choice, we report their uniqueness properties.
Proposition 4 If fptg is a softmax random choice process, then the psychometric utility u in (10) is
cardinally unique, the bias  is unique up to location and, unless fptg is constant, the noise  is unique
given u.28
Since p0 (a; b) = e(a)=

e(a) + e(b)

, a nonconstant function  accounts for the existence of initial, pre-
deliberation, biases in the stochastic choice behavior of the decision maker. In particular,  is constant
(so, irrelevant) if and only if alternatives are a priori homogeneous, with no initial bias in favor of any
alternative over another, that is, p0 (a; b) = 1=2 for all distinct alternatives a and b. An unbiased softmax
process is called multinomial logit and has the form
pt (a;A) =
e
u(a)
(t)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
The value  (t) of function  accounts for the error rate when t is the deliberation time. Without loss
of generality, assume a t b, that is, u (a) > u (b). The error probability is then pt (b; a). Simple algebra
shows that
pt (b; a) =
1
1 + e
u(a) u(b)
(t)
+(a) (b)
(11)
The higher  (t), the higher the error probability (so, the noise). In particular, when  (t) vanishes the
error rate goes to 0, while when  (t) diverges to1 it goes to p0 (b; a) the error rate implied by the initial
bias.
3.3 Representation and empirical identication
To understand the nature of softmax random choice processes, we aim to establish a representation theorem
that identies the properties of random choice processes that make them softmax.
Next we group the deliberative version of a rst set of assumptions that, in view of Luces Theorem,
are necessary for the softmax representation.
Deliberative Luce Axioms:
Positivity pt satises Positivity for all t 2 T0.
Choice Axiom pt satises the Choice Axiom for all t 2 T0.
Continuity pt satises Continuity for all t 2 T0.
By Luces Theorem, these conditions imply that, for each t in T0, there exists a continuous function
vt : X ! R, unique up to location, such that
pt (a;A) =
evt(a)P
b2A e
vt(b)
28A softmax process is constant i.e., pt = ps for all s; t 2 T0 if and only if pt (a;A) = e(a)=
P
b2A e
(b) for all A 2 A,
all a 2 A, and all t 2 T In this case, u must be constant (in particular, cardinally unique),  is unique up to location, and
 is undetermined (see Lemma 20 in Appendix C).
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To attain the softmax representation, we need to express all the functions vt by means of two time
independent functions, utility u and bias , and one time dependent function, noise , such that
vt (a) =
u (a)
 (t)
+  (a)
This is achieved through the next axiom which requires that, over deliberation times, there are no
ordinal reversals in the weight of evidence.
Intensity Consistency Given any s > t in T ,
wt (a; b) > wt (c; d) () ws (a; b) > ws (c; d)
for all a 6= b and c 6= d in X.
In words, this axiom says that if the weight of evidence in favor of the hypothesis a is preferable to
bis, after a given deliberation time, greater than that in favor of the hypothesis c is preferable to d,
the same happens after a longer deliberation time.
In terms of revealed preference intensity, we can equivalently write this axiom as
(a; b) \t (c; d) () (a; b) \s (c; d)
for all s > t. This form justies the axiom name, which requires preference intensities to be time invariant.
The next representation theorem will show that Intensity Consistency characterizes softmax processes.
Yet, as the duality (7) suggests, an alternative characterization is attained by using, together, analogous
non-reversal conditions for t and t . Interestingly, they have a one-way form, weaker than the two-way
form of Intensity Consistency.
Preference Consistency Given any s > t in T ,
pt (a; b) > p0 (a; b) =) ps (a; b) > p0 (a; b)
for all a; b 2 X.
Ease (of Comparison) Consistency Given any s > t in T ,
et (a; b)  et (c; d) =) es (a; b)  es (c; d)
for all a 6= b and c 6= d in X.
In terms of the revealed preference order, Preference Consistency is equivalent to
a t b =) a s b
for all s > t. Preferences are thus stable: as time passes, they are not reverted. This is in accord with the
idea that during deliberation correct (yet noisy) evidence is gathered and analyzed by the decision maker
to inform his choice between the two alternatives.
Ease Consistency, instead, says that the di¢ culty of decision problem fa; bg relative to decision problem
fc; dg is inherent to the alternatives involved and independent of deliberation times. If the comparison
between a and b is not easier than that between c and d, given deliberation time t, then the passage of
time does not make a and b easier to compare than c and d. In terms of revealed ease of comparison, Ease
Consistency is equivalent to
fa; bg s fc; dg =) fa; bg t fc; dg
for all s > t.
We can now state the softmax representation theorem.
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Theorem 5 Let X be a connected topological space and fptg a random choice process. The following
conditions are equivalent:
1. fptg satises the Deliberative Luce Axioms and Intensity Consistency;
2. fptg satises the Deliberative Luce Axioms, Preference Consistency and Ease Consistency;
3. fptg is a softmax process with continuous u;  : X ! R, and  : T ! (0;1), that is,
pt (a;A) =
e
u(a)
(t)
+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
+(b)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A and all t 2 T0.
In this case, u is cardinally unique,  is unique up to location, and, unless fptg is constant,  is unique
given u.
Moreover, process fptg is multinomial logit if and only if alternatives are a priori homogeneous.
An analyst, who observes that the stochastic choices of the decision maker behavior satisfy the axioms
of this theorem, can thus understand his behavior in terms of preference discovery, that is, as if carried
out by a decision maker who is trying to learn the value that alternatives have for him.
More is true: our analyst can actually identify from the probabilistic choices of the decision maker
the softmax components u,  and .29 In fact, since u is a psychometric utility for fptg, if the process is
constant, then u must be constant,  (a)    (b) = `0(a; b) for all a; b 2 X and  is undened, else there
exist at least a pair of alternatives a^ and b^ and a deliberation time t^ such that the preference a^ t^ b^ is
revealed, and the next proposition provides the explicit expression of the parameters.
Proposition 6 Let fptg be a softmax random choice process. If there exist a^; b^ 2 X and t^ 2 T such that
pt^(a^; b^) > p0(a^; b^), then the functions u^; ^ : X ! R and ^ : T ! (0;1) dened by
u^ (x) =
wt^(x; b^)
wt^(a^; b^)
; ^ (x) = `0(x; b^) ; ^ (t) =
1
wt(a^; b^)
(12)
are well dened, with
pt (a;A) =
e
u^(a)
^(t)
+^(a)P
b2A e
u^(b)
^(t)
+^(b)
(13)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A and all t 2 T0.
Summing up, the last two results enable the analyst to interpret the stochastic choice behavior of the
decision maker in terms of softmax preference discovery and to empirically identify the softmax compo-
nents.
Finally, we can extend the results of this section to a general choice set X, without a topology, and to
a general index set T , without an order. This is the subject matter of Appendix D.
29Their estimation is standard, typically carried out by maximum likelihood. See, e.g., Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) on
the econometric side and McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) on the game-theoretic one.
16
3.4 Ordinality and learning
In this section we study how, as deliberation time increases, the stochastic choice behavior of a decision
maker improves, and he becomes less prone to errors.30 Clearly the study of these time-increasing error
rate situations mirrors the one we consider here.
Decreasing Error Rate Given any s > t in T ,
pt (a; b) > p0 (a; b) =) ps (a; b)  pt (a; b)
for all a; b 2 X.
This axiom requires the frequency of mistakes to decrease over deliberation time. Indeed, if u is a
psychometric utility for fptg, according to this axiom we have:31
u (a) > u (b) =) ps (b; a)  pt (b; a)
In words, longer deliberation times decrease the chance of selecting an inferior alternative. To appreciate
the consequences of this axiom, we need an additional one.
Payo¤ Stochastic Dominance Given any s > t in T ,
ps (fa 2 A : u (a) > ug ; A)  pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > ug ; A) 8u 2 R (14)
for all A 2 A.
Payo¤ Stochastic Dominance requires that, for any given utility level u, the probability of obtaining a
payo¤ greater than u is higher after deliberating for a longer amount of time. This notion thus records a
probabilistic improvement, in payo¤ terms, of the decision maker stochastic choice behavior as deliberation
times increase. It is an improvement in the sharp sense of stochastic dominance: distribution ps;A  u 1
(rst-order) stochastically dominates distribution pt;A  u 1.
The next proposition shows that Decreasing Error Rate and Payo¤Stochastic Dominance are equivalent
axioms for softmax processes. So, the former axiom characterizes the stochastic choice behavior of a
softmax decision maker who, according to stochastic dominance, takes better and better decisions as
deliberation times increase. In terms of the softmax specication, it corresponds to a decreasing noise 
on T . In terms of rational inattention, to a time decreasing unit cost of information processing (e.g., the
attention cost of reading and understanding a given paragraph decreases with the time available to do so).
Proposition 7 Let fptg be a nonconstant softmax process with utility u, bias  and noise . The following
conditions are equivalent:
1. fptg satises Decreasing Error Rate;
2. ps (fa 2 A : a s bg ; A)  pt (fa 2 A : a t bg ; A) for all b 2 A 2 A and all s > t in T ;
3. fptg satises Payo¤ Stochastic Dominance;
4.  is decreasing on T .
30For instance, in medical decision making under severe time pressure, the longer the time for a doctor to process informa-
tion, the lower the chance of selecting a suboptimal treatment seems to be (see, e.g., ALQuathani et al., 2016). Yet, other
psychology evidence suggests that overly slack deadlines leave room to procrastination, distractions and fatigue that may
deteriorate choice performance (see, e.g., Ariely and Wertenbroch, 2002).
31Indeed, u (a) > u (b)() a t b() pt (a; b) > p0 (a; b) =) ps (b; a)  pt (b; a).
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In view of this result, it is natural to wonder whether, for longer and longer deliberation times, the
decision maker eventually learns his ranking over alternatives, that is, his preference over them. In other
words, is the preference discovery interpretation of softmax processes true to its name?
To address this question, assume for simplicity that T = (0;1).32 By the last result, under Decreasing
Error Rate the noise  is decreasing on (0;1). This permits to dene a limit random choice rule p1 :
A ! (X) by
p1 (a;A) = lim
t!1
pt (a;A)
for all A 2 A and all a 2 A. On this limit rule we consider the following axiom.
Asymptotic Tie-breaking Given any a; b 2 X,
p1 (a; b) 6= 0; 1 =) p1 (a; b) = p0 (a; b)
This axiom postulates that, if the decision maker is unable to make up his mind between alternatives
a and b irrespective of deliberation time, then he will choose by ipping a biased coin. The coins load is
determined by the initial bias , so the coin is fair if and only if alternatives are a priori homogeneous.
Proposition 8 Let fptg be a nonconstant softmax process with utility u, bias  and noise . If fptg
satises Decreasing Error Rate and Asymptotic Tie-breaking, then
p1 (a;A) = a (argmaxA u)
e(a)P
b2argmaxA u e
(b)
for all A 2 A and all a 2 A. In particular,
u (a) > u (b)() p1 (a; b) = 1
for all a 6= b in X.
According to this proposition, the choice rule p1 reveals a preference  on X dened by
a  b() p1 (a; b) = 1
This preference permits to interpret the non-stochastic limit choice behavior in a traditional ordinal way,
as if carried out by a decision maker who learned his preference so, his psychometric utility u up to an
ordinal transformation and accordingly selects the best alternatives.33
Standard ordinal analysis thus emerges as the limit version, as deliberation time becomes arbitrarily
large, of our cardinal analysis. Alternatively, one can regard standard theory as assuming deliberation
time to be virtual; in real time, decision makers act as if they know their preferences.
4 Inside the black box: the Metropolis-DDM algorithm
According to the preference discovery interpretation, a softmax random choice process represents the choice
probabilities induced by the solution of a rather complex problem of optimal information acquisition. How
can it be implemented by a simple system, say a stylized neural system? Does it have a neurophysiological
foundation? To address these questions, in this section we move from outside to inside the black box, from
an as if revealed preference analysis based on behavioral data to a causal computational neuroscience
analysis calibrated with physiological (in particular, eye-tracking) data.
Specically, we combine Markovian search inside a menu with DDM (Drift Di¤usion Model) pairwise
comparison of its alternatives. Both assumptions are inspired by the seminal eye-tracking study of Russo
and Rosen (1975), nd support in recent theories about memory,34 and are consistent with some of the
32Otherwise, the role of 1 is played by the supremum of T .
33In contrast, an analyst learns u up to a cardinal transformation by observing the decision maker softmax stochastic
behavior (Proposition 6).
34See, e.g., Luck and Vogel (1997), Vogel and Machizawa (2004), and Shadlen and Shohamy (2016).
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experimental ndings of modern eye-tracking studies on multi-alternative choice.35
As in the previous behavioral part, we consider a decision maker who has to select an alternative from
a nite menu A, within an exogenously given deliberation time t > 0.36 Here time represents a constrained
resource which the decision makers decision process relies upon. In what follows, we rst introduce the
di¤erent parts of the decision procedure and we then assemble them. Notation is eased by assuming, unless
explicitly stated otherwise, that A = f0; 1; :::; jAj   1g, with jAj  2, and by identifying elements of (A)
with vectors in the simplex of RjAj.
4.1 Exploration
Exploration of menu A has a classic Markovian format a la Metropolis et al. (1953).37 The decision
maker starts with a rst, automatically accepted, candidate solution b drawn from an initial distribution
 2 (A). Then, given an incumbent solution b, he considers an alternative candidate solution a 6= b
with probability Q (a j b). The only requirements we make on the probability transition matrix Q, called
exploration matrix, is to be symmetric and irreducible.38
These requirements are both satised when the decision maker perceives a distance between alternatives
that can be described by a metric d on A,39 and the probability Q (a j b) is a strictly positive function of
the distance d (a; b). For example, if A is a connected graph (like a wine rack or a vending machine), then
d may be the shortest-path distance and Q may have the form
Q (a j b) = k (A)
d (a; b)
for all a 6= b. Here k (A) is a proportionality factor (independent of a and b) and  2 (0;1) is an exploration
aversion parameter: for large  only the nearest neighbors of the incumbent solution are considered, while
for small  exploration is essentially uniform across alternatives.40
4.2 Binary comparisons
Once proposed, say at time i, alternative a is compared with incumbent b via a value-based DDM.41
According to this model, an alternative is selected as soon as the net neural evidence in its favor reaches
a posited decision threshold  > 0. Specically, the comparison of distinct a and b is assumed to activate
two neuronal populations whose activities (ring rates) provide evidence for the two alternatives.42 If the
35In particular, with the high number of rexations to alternatives previously contemplated by the decision maker, which
is not predicted by the existing models. See, e.g., Krajbich and Rangel (2011) and Reutskaja et al. (2011).
36Along with menu A, time t is thus kept xed throughout this section. For extra clarity, it is the time given to the decision
maker to think through a single decision episode involving the choice problem, so it is the moment in which the deliberation
process is externally terminated and a choice must be made. Other interpretations of t can be analyzed in this setup, but
some modications are required.
37See, e.g., Madras (2002).
38While symmetry is crucial, irreducibility is not (see Baldassi et al., 2019).
39See Russo and Rosen (1975) and Roe, Busemeyer and Townsend (2001).
40If the shortest-path distance is replaced with the discrete distance (or, equivalently, the graph is complete), exploration
becomes genuinely uniform.
41The value-based version of the DDM of Ratcli¤ (1978) was introduced by Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010) and
Milosavljevic et al. (2010). See also Fehr and Rangel (2011).
42See Bogacz et al. (2006) and Shadlen and Shohamy (2016) for neurophysiological and neuropsychological analyses of
this mechanism, Roe, Busemeyer and Townsend (2001), Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010), Milosavljevic et al. (2010),
Krajbich, Lu, Camerer and Rangel (2012), Rangel and Clithero (2014), Clithero (2018) and Chiong, Shum, Webb and Chen
(2019) for applications of this model to the choice of consumption goods, as well as, Ratcli¤, Smith, Brown and McKoon
(2016) for a recent review.
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mean activities of these populations are denoted by v (a) and v (b), the cumulated di¤erence between ring
rates is assumed to have the Brownian motion form
dZa;b = [v (a)  v (b)] d +
p
2 dW
The random variable Za;b (i + ) is interpreted as the net neural evidence in favor of a against b gathered
within  seconds after the proposal, at time i, of alternative a. We adopt the standard interpretation of
the mean activity v (a) as a neural index of value of alternative a,43 and call v : A! R the neural utility
(function) of the decision maker.
A common assumption is that the process is unbiased, that is,
Za;b (i) = 0
When this is not the case, we are in the presence of starting point bias, and
Za;b (i) = a;b
is a nonzero initial condition in ( ; ). The DDM literature44 interprets starting point bias as the e¤ect
of past information about the hypothesis v (a) > v (b).
In both the unbiased and biased cases, comparison ends when Za;b (i + ) reaches either the threshold
 or  . So, the response time is the random variable
RTa;b = min f 2 (0;1) : jZa;b (i + )j = g
At time i+RTa;b, if the upper bound  has been reached, the decision maker accepts proposal a. Otherwise,
if the lower bound   has been reached, proposal a is rejected and the decision maker maintains the
incumbent b. The resulting comparison outcome is the random variable
COa;b =
(
a if Za;b (i +RTa;b) = 
b if Za;b (i +RTa;b) =  
Therefore,45 the probability of accepting proposal a is
P (COa;b = a) =
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
1  e 2[v(a) v(b)]
called acceptance probability, that of rejecting a is
P (COa;b = b) =
e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]   e 2[v(a) v(b)]
1  e 2[v(a) v(b)]
called rejection probability.
In line with a neural utility discovery interpretation, the DDM does not assume that the decision maker
knows the utility di¤erence v (a)   v (b). Instead, he discoversthis di¤erence by accumulating (noisy)
evidence, from either the external environment or memory, until the decision threshold  is reached.46 The
presence of noise in evidence accumulation is what makes utility discovery time consuming and subject to
error.
We denote this model by DDM(v; ; ), where  : AA! ( ; ) is a function, such that a;b =  b;a,
which species an initial condition for the comparison of any two distinct alternatives in A. The DDM is
unbiased when  is null. The unbiased case, often called simple or original in the neuroscience literature,
is the most popular value-based DDM.47
43See Krajbich, Armel and Rangel (2010) and Milosavljevic et al. (2010).
44See, e.g., Bogacz et al. (2006), Bornstein, Khaw, Shohamy and Daw (2017), Gold and Shadlen (2007), Hanks et al.
(2011) and Mulder et al. (2012).
45See, e.g., Ratcli¤ (1978).
46See Shadlen and Shohamy (2016), Tajima, Drugowitsch and Pouget (2016), Fudenberg, Strack and Strzalecki (2018),
Callaway, Rangel and Gri¢ ths (2019), Tajima, Drugowitsch, Patel and Pouget (2019), and Jang, Sharma and Drugowitsch
(2020).
47Baldassi et al. (2019) provide an axiomatization for it.
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4.3 Decision procedure
We now combine Metropolis exploration and value-based DDM comparisons. The resulting procedure
describes a decision maker who, given time t to deliberate, explores menu A in a Markovian way and
sequentially compares alternatives according to the DDM. The algorithm starts at time 0 and terminates
at time t, when the incumbent solution is chosen.
Metropolis-DDM Algorithm
Input: Given t > 0.
Start: Draw a0 from A according to  and
 set 0 = 0,
 set b0 = a0.
Repeat: Draw an+1 from A according to Q ( j bn) and compare it to bn via DDM(v; ; ):
 set n+1 = n +RTan+1;bn,
 set bn+1 = COan+1;bn,
until n+1 > t.
Stop: Set b = bn.
Output: Choose b from A.
This algorithm is consistent with a neural utility discovery interpretation. At each iteration of the
repeat-untilloop, the evaluation of the sign of the utility di¤erence v (a)  v (b) is performed according
to the DDM. In particular, after comparing incumbent b with proposal a and selecting COa;b as the new
incumbent, the decision maker has not learned v (a) and v (b), but rather has performed a test of the
hypothesis that a is more valuable than b.48
The fact that this test is time consuming and subject to error represents the main di¤erence between
the Metropolis-DDM algorithm and the standard brute force comparison-and-elimination algorithm of
classical optimization, sometimes called standard revision (especially in marketing). According to standard
revision, multiple alternatives are pairwise compared and one alternative is permanently eliminated after
each binary comparison. With this, after jAj   1 comparisons, the incumbent solution is an optimal
choice. The implicit assumption which this brute-force procedure rests upon is that pairwise comparisons
are instantaneous and exact. In the time constrained Metropolis-DDM algorithm, instead, the fact that
comparisons are time consuming may lead to incomplete exploration of the menu, while the fact that
comparisons may be erroneous makes it inadvisable to eliminate permanently an alternative that was
judged inferior at a previous stage.
Next we list some of the main features of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm:
 termination time t is exogenous and deterministic;
 the duration RTa;b of each pairwise comparison is endogenous and random, with expectation not
greater than 2=2;
48See Gold and Shadlen (2002, 2007).
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This rule associates, to each ex ante probability , the ex post probability given by its Gibbs transition
P .53 It can be equivalently expressed in terms of odds as follows:
P (a; b)
P (b; a)| {z }
odds post DDM
= e[v(a) v(b)]| {z }
strength of evidence
  (a; b)
 (b; a)| {z }
odds ante DDM
(16)
This rule can be interpreted according to the measurement principle of Section 3.1. With one caveat: in
Equation (8) of that section, the analyst observes the ex ante and the ex post odds, and aims to measure
the unknown strength of evidence. Here, in contrast, the analyst observes the ex post odds and the evidence
threshold, and aims to measure the unknown ex ante odds that are implied by a posited bias . Yet, the
underlying measurement principle is the same: the change in odds for a against b resulting from the DDM
is proportional, via an exponential factor, to the accumulated neural evidence  weighted by the neural
utility di¤erence v (a)   v (b). The quantity  [v (a)  v (b)] is thus the weight of evidence for a against
b that makes the neural system move from the ex ante to the ex post probability of choosing a over b,
according to the Gibbs transition rule.54
Observe that, for a;b = 0, the solution of (16) is easily seen to be  (a; b) = 1=2, as the intuition for the
unbiased DDM suggests. In words, a null initial condition corresponds to a uniform ex ante probability.
In terms of optimality, the Gibbs transition rule can be justied via a routine variational analysis55
through the unique solution of the optimization problem
max
2(fa;bg)

[v (a)  (a) + v (b)  (b)  (v (a) (a; b) + v (b)  (b; a))]  R( k )


Here, the relative entropy R( k )= is the cost  in terms of required information elaboration  of
the change from the ex ante probability  to a candidate ex post probability , assumed to be directly
proportional to their entropic distance and inversely proportional to the accumulated neural evidence .
The expected utility di¤erence
v (a)  (a) + v (b)  (b)  (v (a) (a; b) + v (b)  (b; a))
is, instead, the expected benet of such a change. With this, the objective function becomes the net
expected benet of the change from  to . The Gibbs transition P is the ex post probability that
maximizes such benet.
Denote by  the Gibbs ex ante (binary) probability that has P as its Gibbs transition. Simple
manipulation of formula (15) gives the explicit expression:
 (a; b) =
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b)P (b; a)
(17)
Back to our opening question, we claim that  is the probabilistic rendering of the initial condition
. As argued before, this claim can be understood in terms of both measurement and optimality. More
importantly, perhaps, next we show that the Gibbs binary bijection
( ; ) 3 a;b 7!  (a; b) 2 (0; 1) (18)
between initial conditions and ex ante probabilities, dened via (17), features some remarkable properties.
53This transition is, mutatis mutandis, the analogue of the Gibbs posterior of Zhang (2006a, 2006b).
54When A = fa; bg, with say v (a) > v (b), we can normalize the weight to  by setting v (a) = 1 and v (b) = 0.
55See, e.g., Dupuis and Ellis (1997, p. 27).
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Proposition 9 Given a neural utility v and a threshold , for distinct alternatives a and b in A the Gibbs
binary bijection is such that:
a;b  0()  (a; b)  1=2 (19)
and P (a; b)   (a; b)  
4
jv (a)  v (b)j (20)
The monotonicity formula (19) ensures that a positive bias a;b in favor of a against b corresponds to
a higher ex ante probability  (a; b) of selecting a over b. It implies, inter alia, that a null  corresponds
to a uniform , as we previously checked in a direct way.
The monotonicity formula thus substantiates the claim that  is the ex ante probability naturally
associated to the initial condition . Inequality (20) further corroborates this role of  by showing that it
actually governs the DDMs probabilistic choices when the accumulated evidence  is small or alternatives
have similar neural utilities.
4.5 Enter softmax: transitive DDMs and stationarity
As shown in Figure 3, a Metropolis-DDM algorithm randomly produces a sequence
(b0; a1; 1; b1; :::; bn; an+1; n+1; bn+1; :::)
of incumbents bn, proposals an+1 and elapsed (response) times n+1, which is truncated at time t when the
incumbent is chosen.
At each iteration of the repeat-untilloop, proposal a is accepted as the new incumbent with proba-
bility
P (a; b)
while, with the complementary probability, a is rejected and the old incumbent b is maintained. Therefore,
the probability of selecting a as a new incumbent given the old incumbent b is
M (a j b) = Q (a j b)P (a; b)
for all a 6= b. This Markovian transition probability combines the stochasticity of the Metropolis ex-
ploration mechanism and that of the DDM acceptance/rejection rule. The transition matrix M =
[M (a j b)]a;b2A is called the incumbentstransition matrix of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm.
To study how the Metropolis-DDM algorithm proceeds according to this transition matrix, we introduce
a class of DDMs that will play an important role in our analysis.
Denition 8 A DDM(v; ; ) is transitive if
P (b; a)P (c; b)P (a; c) = P (c; a)P (b; c)P (a; b) (21)
for all distinct alternatives a; b; c 2 A.
In words, a DDM is transitive when violations of transitivity in the choices that it determines are due
only to the presence of noise. Indeed, condition (21) amounts to require that the intransitive cycles
a! b! c! a and a! c! b! a
be equally likely. Since in most of the cases we consider v and  as xed, we will sometimes say that  is
a transitive initial condition if DDM(v; ; ) is transitive.
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Unbiased value-based DDMs are an important example of transitive DDMs. Biased value-based DDMs,
instead, might well not be transitive, so may result in choices between alternatives that feature systematic
intransitivities, thus violating a basic rationality tenet. The DDM transitivity ensures that this is not the
case.
The next result, which builds upon Kolmogorov (1936) and Luce and Suppes (1965),56 shows the
importance of transitive DDMs in our setting.
Proposition 10 Given a neural utility v, a threshold  and an initial condition , the following conditions
are equivalent:
1. the incumbent transition matrix M is reversible for every exploration matrix Q;
2. DDM(v; ; ) is transitive;
3. there exists  2 (A) such that, for all a 6= b in A, the Gibbs ex ante binary probability  (a; b) is
given by
 (a; b) =
 (a;A)
 (a;A) +  (b; A)
Remarkably, this proposition connects properties of altogether di¤erent nature:
1. reversibility ofM , an algorithmic property which is an important su¢ cient condition for the existence
of a stationary distribution of a Markov chain, especially in computational analyses;57
2. transitivity of the DDM, a behavioral property which ensures that violations of transitivity in the
probabilistic choices that it determines are due only to the presence of noise;
3. existence of a universal Gibbs ex ante probability  2 (A) of DDM(v; ; ) that, via conditioning,
determines all Gibbs ex ante binary probabilities  : for all a 6= b in A, now  (a; b) is the conditional
probability  (a j fa; bg).
These connections allow us to study both the stationarity of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm and the
extension of the Gibbs binary bijection to a multi-alternative setting. We rst study the latter extension.
To this end, observe that, for point 3 to hold,  must be the unique fully supported probability  on A
that solves equation
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
= e[v(a) v(b)]   (a;A)
 (b; A)
(22)
for all a 6= b in A. The next result, based on the equivalence of points 2 and 3 of Proposition 10, uses this
equation with unknown  and parameter  to dene a general, multi-alternative, Gibbs bijection as
its solution function.58
Proposition 11 Given a neural utility v and a threshold , Equation (22) denes a bijection
 v; 3  7!  2 + (A)
between the set  v;  ( ; )AA of transitive initial conditions and the set + (A) of fully supported
distributions  on A. In particular,
a;b  0()  (a;A)   (b; A)
for all a 6= b in A.
56On reversibility, see, e.g., Kelly (2011).
57As Geyer (2011, p. 6) writes All known methods for constructing transition probability mechanisms that preserve a
specied equilibrium distribution in non-toy problems are ... reversible.
58A solution function of an equation associates, to each value of the parameter (here ), the corresponding solution of the
equation (here ).
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We turn now to the study of the stationary distribution of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm. The next
result, based on the equivalence of points 1 and 2 of Proposition 10, shows that this stationary distribution
has a softmax form determined only by the components v,  and  of the DDM. In contrast, the initial
distribution  and the exploration matrix Q of the algorithm do not play any role in the stationary
distribution, because they are swamped by iterations.
Proposition 12 Given a neural utility v, a threshold  and an initial condition , if DDM(v;  ; ) is
transitive, then the stationary distribution of the incumbent transition matrix M is
m (a;A) =
 (a;A) ev(a)P
b2A 
 (b; A) ev(b)
8a 2 A (23)
The probabilityMn (a) that, after n iterations of the repeat-until loop, alternative a is the incumbent
solution thus converges, as n diverges to1, to the stationary probability m (a;A) of the Metropolis-DDM
algorithm. Formally, limn!1 (Mn) (a) = m (a;A).
This result shows that a Metropolis-DDM algorithm featuring a transitive DDM has a softmax sta-
tionary distribution with components v,  and  , which thus turn out to be the neural counterparts of
the behavioral softmax components u,  and . A natural identication assumption is  =  , that is,
to assume that the initial distribution of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm be equal to the Gibbs ex ante
probability of its DDM. In this case, the stationary distribution (23) takes the sharp form
m (a;A) =
 (a) ev(a)P
b2A  (b) e
v(b)
8a 2 A
The consequence of this identication assumption will be explored in the next section.
That said, what does this last proposition say about the output of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm?
Since the average duration of each iteration is bounded by 2=2, the answer depends on whether the
evidence threshold  is small or large relative to the time t when the algorithm is stopped. If  is large
relative to t, then the algorithm might even stop before the rst DDM comparison is nished, and so the
probability of choosing a is circa  (a).
In contrast, if  is small relative to t, then the algorithm performs many iterations and the softmax
stationary distribution m (a;A) becomes a good approximation of the probability of choosing a among the
alternatives in A. This is the way in which softmax enters our neural analysis.
4.6 Simulations
This last discussion begs a natural question: How physiologically plausible is the convergence of the
Metropolis-DDM algorithm to its softmax stationary distribution? To address this key question, we rst
calibrate the algorithm with physiological data and then run simulations. To calibrate, observe that the
components v,  and  of the stationary softmax distribution (23) either coincide with (like v and )
or are uniquely determined by (like ) the components of the underlying DDM(v; ; ), which can be
easily estimated by eye-tracking techniques. For instance, Milosavljevic et al. (2010) elicit these DDM
components and observe that augmenting time pressure (that is reducing t) decreases .59 Specically,
their estimates for unbiased binary DDM comparisons, under both high and low time pressure, correspond
to maxa;b2A jv (a)  v (b)j  7:071, with   0:849 for high time pressure (t = 4 seconds) and   1:442
for low time pressure (t = 12 seconds).
Using these physiological data, we simulate the Metropolis-DDM algorithm and test its softmax con-
vergence. In the plots below we report the output of some simulations with A = f0; 1; :::; 7g. In all cases,
the empirical distribution of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm is simulated by running it 10; 000 times.
59See also Karsilar, Simen, Papadakis and Balci (2014).
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Simulation 1 Choose in 4 seconds with v (a) = a  3:5 and 4 = 0:849:
Simulation 2 Choose in 4 seconds with v (a) = ja  3:5j and 4 = 0:849:
Simulation 3 Choose in 12 seconds with v (a) = a  3:5 and 12 = 1:442:
Simulation 4 Choose in 12 seconds with v (a) = ja  3:5j and 12 = 1:442:
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These simulations show that, when calibrated with the experimental data of Milosavljevic et al. (2010),
the output of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm is indistinguishable from softmaximization. What makes
this convergence remarkable is that the algorithm only runs for a few seconds, 4 or 12, and performs a
relatively small (and random) number of iterations, yet the empirical distribution that it generates matches
(23) almost perfectly.
Summing up, our simulations show that, when calibrated with physiological data, the Metropolis-
DDM algorithm is able to converge to its softmax stationary distribution. Softmax thus solidly enters our
analysis.
5 Outside and inside the black box
Causes and e¤ects Our external, behavioral, analysis identies the behavioral conditions character-
izing softmax stochastic choice and permits the empirical elicitation of its components, thus providing
a behavioral foundation for an as if interpretation of the decision maker stochastic choice in terms of
preference discovery. Our internal, causal, analysis provides a biologically inspired algorithm that may
explain softmax emergence in stochastic choice.
Conceptually, these complementary approaches provide a complete perspective on softmaximization
as a model of preference discovery both in terms of internal (neuropsychological) causes and external
(behavioral) e¤ects.
Empirically, the cause-e¤ect nexus between the two analyses permits to identify and cross-validate the
components of the behavioral and neural softmax specications. This empirical interplay is the subject
matter of this section.
We rst introduce neural random choice processes, the inner counterpart of the behavioral random
choice processes of the rst part of the paper, and then propose an identication and cross-validation
procedure.
Neural random choice processes We extend the neural analysis of the last section from a xed pair
A and t of menus and deliberation times to any such pair. To abstract from both context and deliberation
time e¤ects, we dene:
(i) a neural utility v : X ! R on the set X of all alternatives, which has the neural utility v of last
section as its restriction on menu A;60
(ii) a strictly positive initial distribution , which has the initial distribution  of last section as its
conditional on menu A;
60For convenience, we assume X to be nite, the innite case extension being straightforward.
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(iii) a threshold function  : T ! (0;1) which has the quantity  of last section as its value at deliber-
ation time t;
(iv) a family ftgt2T of initial conditions t : X  X ! (  (t) ;  (t)), one for each t, which has the
function  of last section as its restriction on A A;
(v) a strictly positive exploration matrix Q on X  X which has the matrix Q of last section as its
conditional version on A A.
With these universalversions, the value-based DDM of last section takes now the form
DDM(v;  (t) ; t)
Our analysis relies on the following identication assumption
 = t 8t > 0
It equates the initial distribution of the Metropolis-DDM algorithm a free parameter in our exercise 
with the Gibbs ex ante probability of the DDM for each deliberation time. Because of this assumption,
we may call  the (initial) neural bias of the algorithm.
In view of the previous simulations, we also assume that for each deliberation time t the Metropolis-
DDM algorithm converges to its stationary distribution. The algorithm then induces a neural random
choice process fmtgt2T0 given, for each menu A 2 A, by
mt (a;A) =
 (a) e(t)v(a)P
b2A  (b) e
(t)v(b)
8t 2 T
and m0 (a;A) =  (a) =
P
b2A  (b) because of our identication assumption.
Process fmtgt2T0 summarizes the stochastic choice behavior caused by neural decision processes that
occur inside the black box.
An identication and cross-validation procedure In the softmax representation theorem (Theorem
5) we axiomatize a behavioral random choice process fptgt2T0 given, for each menu A 2 A, by
pt (a;A) =
e
u(a)
(t)
+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
+(b)
8t 2 T
and p0 (a;A) = e(a)=
P
b2A e
(b).
Inside the black box, each Metropolis-DDM algorithm generates choices described by process fmtgt2T0.
Outside the black box, an analyst observes process fptgt2T0, so the e¤ects of the neural system decision
processes. The next procedure shows how the analyst can combine the inside and outside perspectives to
identify and cross-validate the values of the components of both processes.
Identication and cross-validation procedure
Neural softmax hypothesis The Metropolis-DDM approximates its softmax stationary distribution
fmtg given by (23), that is, for all t 2 T0 and all a 2 A 2 A,
mt (a;A) =
 (a) e(t)v(a)P
b2A  (b) e
(t)v(b)
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with unknown neural components v,  and .
Behavioral data The analyst observes a random choice process fptg, describing the frequencies of choice.
Behavioral test The analyst checks whether fptg satises the axioms of Theorem 5. If this is the case,
so the neural softmax hypothesis is not rejected, the analyst posits that m = p, that is, for all t 2 T0 and
all a 2 A 2 A,
e
u(a)
(t)
+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
+(b)
= pt (a;A) = mt (a;A) =
 (a) e(t)v(a)P
b2A  (b) e
(t)v(b)
with unknown behavioral components u,  and .
Identication If not constant, the softmax choice process fptg reveals, by Proposition 6, to the analyst
the values u^, ^ and ^ of the behavioral components of fptg. By the uniqueness property of softmax
(Proposition 4), we have
v = u^ ;  = ln ^ ;  = ^ 1
up to a cardinal transformation.61 The neural components are thus identied.
Cross-validation If available physiological data permit to identify the neural components v,  and , the
analyst can cross-validate the values previously obtained.
This procedure shows the signicant interplay between the inner and outer perspectives on stochastic
choice studied in this paper. Far from being disconnected, these two perspectives complement each other
conceptually by providing external (behavioral) and internal (causal) explanations of softmax stochastic
choice behavior as well as empirically by permitting to identify and cross-validate the components of
the softmax specications. In particular, we have the following inner/outer counterparts:
Inner Outer
Neural utility v Psychometric utility u
Neural bias  Behavioral bias 
Threshold  Noise 
We close by observing that the interplay discussed in this section gives a simulated annealing avor
to the convergence result established by Proposition 8 (Section 3.4). As the pressure of time diminishes,
the DDM threshold can increase, so that errors become less frequent and the Metropolis-DDM algorithm
approximates standard optimization.
6 Concluding remarks
The previous section concluded our analysis by showing how it complements that of Matejka and McKay
(2015) by providing an external verication and an internal justication of the softmax model, for which
they establish an optimal information acquisition foundation. Our two approaches complement each other,
leaving no room for free parameters.
In these concluding remarks, we explore limitations and possible future extensions.
61That is, there exist j; k > 0 and h 2 R such that v = ku+ h,  = je and  = 1=k.
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Beyond softmax. To put our softmax revealed preference analysis (Section 3) in a wider perspective
we briey discuss a general specication of a random choice process. In particular, in the next denition
we generalize to our deliberation context the denition of utility for random choice rules introduced by
Debreu (1958) and Davidson and Marschak (1959).
Denition 9 A psychometric utility function u and an initial bias  on X rationalize a random choice
process fptg if, at each deliberation time t and all alternatives a; b; c; d 2 X:
u (a)  u (b)  u (c)  u (d) and  (a)   (b)   (c)   (d) =) pt (a; b)  pt (c; d) :
It is easy to see that this amounts to requiring the existence, at each deliberation time t, of a time
dependent function t, increasing in both arguments, such that
pt (a; b) = t (u (a)  u (b) ;  (a)   (b))
for all distinct alternatives a; b 2 X.62 Softmax is the special case
t (x; y) =
1
1 + e 
x
(t)
 y
so that (11) holds, i.e.,
pt (a; b) =
1
1 + e 
u(a) u(b)
(t)
 [(a) (b)]
A pair (u; ) is thus needed to understand random choice processes, u alone is no longer enough as
it was, instead, in the analyses of Debreu, Davidson and Marschak of random choice rules. The noise  is
peculiar to the softmax case, where it parametrizes the exponential form of t.
A natural question, which may be explored in future research, is how the analysis of Debreu (1958) may
generalize in this setup, determining which conditions on a random choice process ensure the existence
of the pair (u; ). A result along these lines would be in relation to Debreu (1958) what our softmax
representation theorem (Theorem 5) is to Luce (1959).
Adaptive exploration in the Metropolis-DDM algorithm. A more sophisticated version of the
Metropolis-DDM algorithm should perhaps take into account the fact that although the decision maker
does not experience the utility from alternatives along the exploration, he might realize that some alter-
natives must have similar utility, as he observes that comparing them takes a long time. For this reason,
rather than exploring the menu in a homogeneous Markovian way, he might start with uniform exploration
at the rst iteration, and then, at each subsequent iteration, penalize alternatives when the comparison is
particularly time consuming.
This variation, introduced by Baldassi et al. (2020), permits to diminish the frequency of useless
comparisons (those between alternatives with similar utility), increases the number of iterations before the
deadline, performs very well numerically, and poses some mathematical questions.
Quantal response equilibrium. The softmax functional form can be regarded as a formalization of the
Discovered Preference Hypothesis outlined in Plott (1996). According to this hypothesis, decision makers
learn how their basic needs are satised by the di¤erent alternatives in the choice environment through a
process of reection and practice that, in the long run, leads to optimizing behavior.
Reection is readily captured in our model by the deliberation time. If one considers applications to
data analysis, this extension points to a di¤erent natural interpretation of the set T . Instead of a deadline,
62The real-valued function t has domain (Imu  Imu) (Im  Im).
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each t of T may represent the number of times that the decision maker has been facing choice problem A.
Under this interpretation, softmax can be seen as capturing preference discovery through practice.
Softmaximization is the form that preference discovery takes in the Quantal Response Equilibrium
(QRE) theory of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). In their theory, t is the number of times an agent played
the game, and thus measures his experience level, u (a) is the expected payo¤ of action a, and  (t) indexes
the agents degree of rationality. From the original data analysis of McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) to the
recent Agranov, Caplin and Tergiman (2015), Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2016) and Ortega and Stocker
(2016) evidence seems to suggest that, for sophisticated players, the function  increases as time passes
and the decision making environment is better understood.63
Our axiomatic and neuropsychological characterizations of softmax can thus be seen as alternative
foundations of QRE. The rst identies the discovery outcome, the second explains the discovery process.
QRE is thus the equilibrium concept that corresponds to the decision theory developed in this paper.
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2016) give a broad perspective of its di¤erent applications.
7 Acknowledgements
A rst draft of this paper was circulated under the title Law of Demand and Forced Choiceas IGIER
WP 593, 2016. We thank Jerome Adda, Pierpaolo Battigalli, Patrick Beissner, Renato Berlinghieri, An-
drei Borodin, Roberto Corrao, Federico Echenique, Agata Farina, Marcelo Fernandez, Loic Grenie, Philip
Holmes, Ryota Iijima, Michael Konig, Giacomo Lanzani, Jay Lu, Laura Maspero, Thomas Palfrey, Charles
Plott, Antonio Rangel, Roger Ratcli¤, Giorgia Romagnoli, Kota Saito, Larry Samuelson, Vaibhav Srivas-
tava, Jakub Steiner, Tomasz Strzalecki, as well as several seminar audiences. We especially thank Carlo
Baldassi and Giulio Principi for very useful discussions and Marco Pirazzini for coding assistance. Si-
mone Cerreia-Vioglio and Massimo Marinacci gratefully acknowledge the nancial support of ERC (grants
SDDM-TEA and INDIMACRO, respectively).
A Proofs of the results of Section 2.1
Recall that X26= = f(a; b) : a 6= b in Xg denotes the set of all pairs of distinct alternatives in X, and that
jXj  3.
Lemma 13 Let X be a topological space. Under the hypotheses of Theorem 1, the following conditions
are equivalent:
1. the function p : (a; b) 7! p (a; b) is continuous on X26=;
2. the function r : (a; b) 7! r (a; b) is continuous on X2;
3. the function v : X ! R is continuous.
Proof of Lemma 13 1 implies 3. Let fxg be a net in X with index set N directed by >. Assume
x ! x in X and take y 6= x.
If there exists  2 N such that x 6= y for all  > , then the net f(x; y)g> is contained in X26= and
converges to (x; y). Point 1 guarantees that fp (x; y)g> converges to p (x; y). Then
lim
>
1
1 + e [v(x) v(y)]
=
1
1 + e [v(x) v(y)]
63Interestingly, in Agranov, Caplin, and Tergiman (2015) and Ortega and Stocker (2016), t is not the experience level, but
the time the player had to contemplate the alternatives in A before choosing.
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and so
lim
2N
1
1 + e [v(x) v(y)]
=
1
1 + e [v(x) v(y)]
which implies lim2N [v (x)  v (y)] = v (x)  v (y) and lim2N v (x) = v (x).
Else, for all  2 N there exists  >  such that x = y. But, y then belongs to all neighborhoods of
x because x ! x. Take z distinct from x and y (this is possible because X has at least three elements).
Then, the net f(y; z)g2N converges to (x; z) in X26=.64 Point 1 guarantees that v (y)   v (z) converges to
v (x)  v (z) and v (x) = v (y). Now consider the net
~x =
(
x if x 6= y
x if x = y
Note that ~x ! x, v (x) = v (~x) for all  2 N , and ~x 6= y for all  2 N . But, then f(~x; y)g2N
converges to (x; y) in X26=, so that fv (~x)g2N converges to v (x), and so does fv (x)g2N = fv (~x)g2N .
Summing up, v is continuous.
3 implies 2. To prove this, observe that, for all (a; b) 2 X2 (also when a = b), r (a; b) = ev(a) v(b).
2 implies 1. For all (a; b) 2 X26=,
p (a; b) =
1
1 + e [v(a) v(b)]
=
r (a; b)
r (a; b) + 1
and continuity follows immediately. 
Lemma 14 Let p : A ! (X) be a random choice rule. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. p is such that, pA (C) = pB (C) pA (B) for all C  B  A in A;
2. p satises the Choice Axiom;
3. p is such that p (b; B) p (a;A) = p (a;B) p (b; A) for all B  A in A and all a; b 2 B;
4. p is such that
p (a; b)
p (b; a)
=
p (a;A)
p (b; A)
(Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives)
for all A 2 A and all a; b 2 A such that p (a;A) =p (b; A) is well dened;65
5. p is such that p (Y \B;A) = p (Y;B) p (B;A) for all B  A in A and all Y  X.
Moreover, in this case, p satises Positivity if and only if pA has full support for all A in A (that is,
p (a;A) > 0 for all a 2 A 2 A).
Proof 1 implies 2. Choose as C the singleton a appearing in the statement of the axiom.
2 implies 3. Given any B  A in A and any a; b 2 B, by the Choice Axiom, p (a;A) = p (a;B) p (B;A),
but then p (b; B) p (a;A) = p (a;B) p (b; B) p (B;A) = p (a;B) p (b; A) where the second equality follows
from another application of the Choice Axiom.
3 implies 4. Let A 2 A and arbitrarily choose a; b 2 A such that p (a;A) =p (b; A) 6= 0=0. By point 3,
p (b; a) p (a;A) = p (b; fa; bg) p (a;A) = p (a; fa; bg) p (b; A) = p (a; b) p (b; A)
three cases have to be considered:
64We are denoting by f(y; z)g2N any net f(y; z)g2N in X26= such that y  y and z  z.
65That is, di¤erent from 0=0.
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 p (b; a) 6= 0 and p (b; A) 6= 0, then p (a;A) =p (b; A) = p (a; b) =p (b; a);
 p (b; a) = 0, then p (a; b) p (b; A) = 0, but p (a; b) 6= 0 (because p (a; b) =p (b; a) 6= 0=0), thus p (b; A) =
0 and p (a;A) 6= 0 (because p (a;A) =p (b; A) 6= 0=0); therefore
p (a; b)
p (b; a)
=1 = p (a;A)
p (b; A)
 p (b; A) = 0, then p (b; a) p (a;A) = 0, but p (a;A) 6= 0 (because p (a;A) =p (b; A) 6= 0=0), thus
p (b; a) = 0 and p (a; b) 6= 0 (because p (a; b) =p (b; a) 6= 0=0); therefore
p (a;A)
p (b; A)
=1 = p (a; b)
p (b; a)
4 implies 3. Given any B  A in A and any a; b 2 B:
 If p (a;A) =p (b; A) 6= 0=0 and p (a;B) =p (b; B) 6= 0=0, then by Independence from Irrelevant Alter-
natives
p (a;A)
p (b; A)
=
p (a; b)
p (b; a)
=
p (a;B)
p (b; B)
 If p (b; A) 6= 0, then p (b; B) 6= 0 and p (b; B) p (a;A) = p (a;B) p (b; A).
 Else p (b; A) = 0, then p (b; B) = 0 and again p (b; B) p (a;A) = p (a;B) p (b; A).
 Else, either p (a;A) =p (b; A) = 0=0 or p (a;B) =p (b; B) = 0=0 and in both cases
p (b; B) p (a;A) = p (a;B) p (b; A)
3 implies 5. Given any B  A in A and any Y  X, since p (B;B) = 1, it follows p (Y;B) =
p (Y \B;B). Therefore
p (Y \B;A) =
X
y2Y \B
p (y; A) =
X
y2Y \B
 X
x2B
p (x;B)
!
p (y; A) =
X
y2Y \B
 X
x2B
p (x;B) p (y; A)
!
[by point 3] =
X
y2Y \B
 X
x2B
p (y;B) p (x;A)
!
=
X
y2Y \B
p (y;B)
 X
x2B
p (x;A)
!
=
X
y2Y \B
p (y;B) p (B;A) = p (Y \B;B) p (B;A) = p (Y;B) p (B;A)
5 implies 1. Take Y = C.
Finally, let p satisfy the Choice Axiom. Assume  per contra Positivity holds and p (a;A) = 0
for some A 2 A and some a 2 A. Then A 6= fag and, for all b 2 A n fag, the Choice Axiom implies
0 = p (a;A) = p (a; fa; bg) p (fa; bg ; A) = p (a; b) (p (a;A) + p (b; A)) = p (a; b) p (b; A) whence p (b; A) = 0
(because p (a; b) 6= 0), contradicting p (A;A) = 1. Therefore Positivity implies that pA has full support for
all A in A. The converse is trivial. 
The next result characterizes a special case of the general Luces model of Echenique and Saito (2018).
Specically, Theorem 15 extends Theorem 1 by maintaining the assumption of Independence from Irrele-
vant Alternatives while removing that of full support. In the subsequent analysis, this theorem will allow
us to distill the utility function u starting from choice frequencies. In reading it, recall that a choice
correspondence is a map   : A ! A such that   (A)  A for all A 2 A. A choice correspondence is called
rational if it satises the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference of Arrow (1959), that is,
B  A 2 A and   (A) \B 6= ? imply   (B) =   (A) \B
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Theorem 15 A random choice rule p : A ! (X) satises the Choice Axiom if and only if there exist
a function v : X ! R and a rational choice correspondence   : A ! A such that
p (a;A) =
8><>:
ev(a)P
b2 (A) e
v(b)
if a 2   (A)
0 else
for all A 2 A and all a 2 A.
In this case,   is unique and   (A) = supp pA for all A 2 A.
Proof See Cerreia-Vioglio, Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2016). 
B Proofs of the results of Section 2.3
Lemma 16 Let X be a connected topological space, and v and w be two continuous functions from X
to R such that, for all x and y in X, v (x)  v (y) implies w (x)  w (y). The following conditions are
equivalent:
1. for all x; y; z 2 X,
v (x) + v (y)
2
= v (z) () w (x) + w (y)
2
= w (z)
2. for all x; y; a; b 2 X,
v (x)  v (a) = v (b)  v (y) () w (x)  w (a) = w (b)  w (y)
3. for all x; y; a; b 2 X,
jv (x)  v (a)j = jv (b)  v (y)j () jw (x)  w (a)j = jw (b)  w (y)j
4. there exist  > 0 and  2 R such that w = v + .
Proof If v is constant, the lemma is trivial. Assume v (X) is a nondegenerate interval. By Lemma
A.1.5 of Wakker (1989), there exists a (weakly) increasing and continuous  : v (X) ! w (X) such that
w =   v.
4 implies 3. For all x; y; a; b 2 X,
jv (x)  v (a)j = jv (b)  v (y)j ()  jv (x)  v (a)j =  jv (b)  v (y)j
() j[v (x) + ]  [v (a) + ]j = j[v (b) + ]  [v (y) + ]j
() jw (x)  w (a)j = jw (b)  w (y)j
3 implies 2. For all x; y; a; b 2 X,
v (x)  v (a) = v (b)  v (y) =) jv (x)  v (a)j = jv (b)  v (y)j () jw (x)  w (a)j = jw (b)  w (y)j
If v (x)  v (a)  0, then v (b)  v (y)  0, and w (x)  w (a) and w (b)  w (y), hence
w (x)  w (a) = jw (x)  w (a)j = jw (b)  w (y)j = w (b)  w (y)
else if v (x)  v (a) < 0, then v (b)  v (y) < 0, and w (x)  w (a) and w (b)  w (y), hence
w (x)  w (a) =   jw (x)  w (a)j =   jw (b)  w (y)j = w (b)  w (y)
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Thus
v (x)  v (a) = v (b)  v (y) =) w (x)  w (a) = w (b)  w (y)
To prove the converse, rst notice that  must be injective. In fact, for all v (x) ; v (a) 2 v (X),
 (v (x)) =  (v (a)) =) w (x) = w (a) =) jw (x)  w (a)j = jw (x)  w (x)j
=) jv (x)  v (a)j = jv (x)  v (x)j = 0
Then  is bijective and strictly increasing, hence, for all x; y; a; b 2 X,
w (x)  w (a) = w (b)  w (y) =) jw (x)  w (a)j = jw (b)  w (y)j =) jv (x)  v (a)j = jv (b)  v (y)j
If w (x)   w (a)  0, then w (b)   w (y)  0, and v (x) =  1 (w (x))   1 (w (a)) = v (a) and v (b) =
 1 (w (b))   1 (w (y)) = v (y), hence
v (x)  v (a) = jv (x)  v (a)j = jv (b)  v (y)j = v (b)  v (y)
else if w (x)   w (a) < 0, then w (b)   w (y) < 0, and v (x) =  1 (w (x))   1 (w (a)) = v (a) and
v (b) =  1 (w (b))   1 (w (y)) = v (y), hence
v (x)  v (a) =   jv (x)  v (a)j =   jv (b)  v (y)j = v (b)  v (y)
Thus
w (x)  w (a) = w (b)  w (y) =) v (x)  v (a) = v (b)  v (y)
2 implies 1. For all x; y; z 2 X,
v (x) + v (y)
2
= v (z) () v (x) + v (y) = 2v (z) () v (x)  v (z) = v (z)  v (y)
() w (x)  w (z) = w (z)  w (y) () w (x) + w (y)
2
= w (z)
1 implies 4. First notice that  must be injective. In fact, for all v (x) ; v (y) 2 v (X),
 (v (x)) =  (v (y)) =) w (x) = w (y) =) w (x) + w (y)
2
= w (x)
=) v (x) + v (y)
2
= v (x) =) v (x) + v (y) = 2v (x)
Then  is bijective and strictly increasing. Let [; ] be a closed nondegenerate interval in v (X), and
notice that, for all v (x) ; v (y) ; v (z) 2 [; ],
w (x) + w (y)
2
= w (z) () v (x) + v (y)
2
= v (z)
thus
 (v (x)) +  (v (y))
2
=  (v (z)) () v (x) + v (y)
2
= v (z)
Denoting by  the identity function  () =  for all  2 [; ], and using the notation of Hardy, Littlewood,
and Polya (1934), we have
M (v (x) ; v (y)) = v (z) () M (v (x) ; v (y)) = v (z)
by their Statements 83 and 89, it follows
 =  + 
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for some  6= 0 and  2 R. Since  is strictly increasing, then  > 0. Finally, since v (X) is a nondegenerate
interval, there exists an increasing sequence [n; n] of closed nondegenerate intervals in v (X) such that
[n; n]% v (X). For each n,
 () = n () + n 8 2 [n; n]
 (0) = n+1 (0) + n+1 80 2 [n+1; n+1]
but then, n = n+1 = 1 and n = n+1 = 1 for all n. 
Denition 10 Let v : X ! R be a function. The relations dened on X and on A2 by
a  b () v (a) > v (b)
fa; bg  fc; dg () jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
are called psychometric preferences represented by v. The relation dened on X26= by
(a; b) \ (c; d) () v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d)
is called preference intensity represented by v.
Proposition 17 Let v : X ! R be a function.
1. If (;) are psychometric preferences represented by v, then the relation dened by
(a; b) _\ (c; d) ()
8<:
either (i) a % b and c % d and fa; bg  fc; dg
or (ii) a  b and c  d
or (iii) a - b and c - d and fc; dg  fa; bg
is a preference intensity represented by v.
2. If \ is a preference intensity represented by v, then the relations dened by
a _ b () (a; c) \ (b; c) for all c 6= a; b in X
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
are psychometric preferences represented by v.66
3. In both cases, the function v is such that
a  b () v (a) > v (b)
fa; bg  fc; dg () jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
(a; b) \ (c; d) () v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d)
where the decorations are omitted.
Moreover, if (;) are psychometric preferences, and _\ is the derived preference intensity, then 
;  = (;); dually, if \ is a preference intensity and   _; _ are the derived psychometric pref-
erences, then \ = \.
66Because of the possibility that a _b or c _d, or both, the clause (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)must be pedantically
read as (x; y) \ (z; w) whenever (x; y) is a pair consisting of distinct maximal and minimal elements of fa; bg with respect
to _ and (z; w) is a pair consisting of distinct maximal and minimal elements of fc; dg with respect to _.
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Proof 1) By denition of psychometric preferences represented by v:
a  b () v (a) > v (b)
fa; bg  fc; dg () jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
Moreover, given any a 6= b and c 6= d in X, and abbreviating eitherwith ei.,
(a; b) _\ (c; d) ()
8<:
either (i) a % b and c % d and fa; bg  fc; dg
or (ii) a  b and c  d
or (iii) a - b and c - d and fc; dg  fa; bg
()
8<:
ei. v (a)  v (b)  0; v (c)  v (d)  0; jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
or v (a)  v (b) > 0; v (c)  v (d) < 0
or v (a)  v (b)  0; v (c)  v (d)  0; jv (c)  v (d)j > jv (a)  v (b)j
()
8<:
ei. v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d)  0
or v (a)  v (b) > 0 > v (c)  v (d)
or v (a)  v (b)  0; v (c)  v (d)  0;   [v (c)  v (d)] >   [v (a)  v (b)]
()
8<:
ei. v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d)  0
or v (a)  v (b) > 0 > v (c)  v (d)
or 0  v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d)
() v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d)
hence _\ is a preference intensity represented by v.
2) If \ is a preference intensity represented by v, then, given any a; b 2 X,
a _ b () (a; c) \ (b; c) for all c 6= a; b in X
() v (a)  v (c) > v (b)  v (c) for all c 6= a; b in X () v (a) > v (b)
Moreover, given any fa; bg and fc; dg in A2, there are the following nine possibilities:
(i) v (a) > v (b) and v (c) > v (d), then
ag b = a; af b = b; cg d = c; cf d = d
hence
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
() (a; b) \ (c; d)
() v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d)
() jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
(ii) v (a) > v (b) and v (c) = v (d), then
ag b = a; af b = b
and, either cg d = c; cf d = d or cg d = d; cf d = c, hence
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
() (a; b) \ (c; d) and (a; b) \ (d; c)
() v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d) and v (a)  v (b) > v (d)  v (c)
() jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
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(iii) v (a) > v (b) and v (c) < v (d), then
ag b = a; af b = b; cg d = d; cf d = c
hence
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
() (a; b) \ (d; c)
() v (a)  v (b) > v (d)  v (c)
() jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
(iv) v (a) = v (b) and v (c) > v (d), then
cg d = c; cf d = d
and, either ag b = a; af b = b or ag b = b; af b = a, hence
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
() (a; b) \ (c; d) and (b; a) \ (c; d)
() v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d) and v (b)  v (a) > v (c)  v (d)
() jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
Note that v (a)   v (b) = 0, so jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j is impossible, but this fact is formally
irrelevant; it only means that if v (a) = v (b) and v (c) > v (d), then it cannot be the case that
fa; bg _ fc; dg.
(v) v (a) = v (b) and v (c) = v (d), then for all (x; y) ; (z; w) 2 X26= such that (x; y) is a pair consisting of
distinct maximal and minimal elements of fa; bg with respect to _ and (z; w) is a pair consisting of
distinct maximal and minimal elements of fc; dg with respect to _, we have v (x) = v (y) = v (a) =
v (b) and v (z) = v (w) = v (c) = v (d), thus
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (x; y) \ (z; w) for all these pairs
() 0 > 0 () jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
(Note that ...)
(vi) v (a) = v (b) and v (c) < v (d), then
cg d = d; cf d = c
and, either ag b = a; af b = b or ag b = b; af b = a, hence
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
() (a; b) \ (d; c) and (b; a) \ (d; c)
() v (a)  v (b) > v (d)  v (c) and v (b)  v (a) > v (d)  v (c)
() jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
(Note that ...)
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(vii) v (a) < v (b) and v (c) > v (d), then
ag b = b; af b = a; cg d = c; cf d = d
hence
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
() (b; a) \ (c; d)
() v (b)  v (a) > v (c)  v (d)
() jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
(viii) v (a) < v (b) and v (c) = v (d), then
ag b = b; af b = a
and, either cg d = c; cf d = d or cg d = d; cf d = c, hence
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
() (b; a) \ (c; d) and (b; a) \ (d; c)
() v (b)  v (a) > v (c)  v (d) and v (b)  v (a) > v (d)  v (c)
() jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
(ix) v (a) < v (b) and v (c) < v (d), then
ag b = b; af b = a; cg d = d; cf d = c
hence
fa; bg _ fc; dg () (ag b; af b) \ (cg d; cf d)
() (b; a) \ (d; c)
() v (b)  v (a) > v (d)  v (c)
() jv (a)  v (b)j > jv (c)  v (d)j
Summing up,
 
_; _ are psychometric preferences represented by v.
The rest is a routine verication ... 
Lemma 18 Let X be a connected topological space and v;w : X ! R be continuous functions. The
following conditions are equivalent:
1. v and w represent the same psychometric preferences;
2. v and w represent the same preference intensity;
3. there exist  > 0 and  2 R such that w = v + .
Proof Assume that v : X ! R and w : X ! R are continuous functions such that, given any a 6= b
and c 6= d in X,
v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d) () (a; b) \ (c; d) () w (a)  w (b) > w (c)  w (d) (24)
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Taking, for any a 6= b, an element c = ca;b such that c 6= a; b, we have
v (a)  v (c) > v (b)  v (c) () w (a)  w (c) > w (b)  w (c)
that is
v (a)  v (b) () w (a)  w (b) (25)
and the same is obviously true if a = b. In turn, (24) and (25) imply that
v (a)  v (b) > v (c)  v (d) () w (a)  w (b) > w (c)  w (d)
for all a; b; c; d 2 X.
Next we show that this implies point 2 of Lemma 16. Given any a; b; c; d 2 X, if v (a)  v (b) = v (c) 
v (d), since w (a) w (b) ? w (c) w (d) would imply v (a)  v (b) ? v (c)  v (d), then it must be the case
that w (a) w (b) = w (c) w (d). That is, v (a) v (b) = v (c) v (d) implies w (a) w (b) = w (c) w (d),
and the converse implication is obtained by exchanging the roles of v and w. Lemma 16 allows us to
conclude that there exist  > 0 and  2 R such that w = v + .
This shows that, if v and w represent the same preference intensity, then there exist  > 0 and  2 R
such that w = v + . The converse is trivial.
Finally, Proposition 17 shows that v and w represent the same preference intensity if and only if they
represent the same psychometric preferences. 
Not only these results yield Lemma 2 and completely characterize the duality described by diagram
(7), but they also lead to the following corollary which will be key in the proof of Theorem 5 below.
Corollary 19 Let X be a connected topological space, (t;t ) and (s;s) be psychometric preferences
represented by continuous ut and us, and \t and \s be the corresponding preference intensities. The
following conditions are equivalent:
1. given any a 6= b and c 6= d in X,
a t b =) a s b (Preference Consistency)
fa; bg s fc; dg =) fa; bg t fc; dg (Ease Consistency)
2. given any a 6= b and c 6= d in X,
(a; b) \t (c; d) () (a; b) \s (c; d) (Intensity Consistency)
3. there exist  > 0 and  2 R such that us = ut + .
Proof 1 implies 2. It su¢ ces to prove that point 1 implies (s;s) = (t;t ), because then \s and
\t coincide (by Proposition 17). At the risk of being pedantic, let us observe that the implication required
by Preference Consistency also holds when a = b (in a vacuous way because the antecedent a t b is false).
First, we show that, given any a; b 2 X, a s b =) a t b. Assume per contra that a s b and not
a t b. It cannot be the case that b t a, because Preference Consistency would imply b s a. Therefore
b t a holds and ut (b) = ut (a). Moreover, a s b implies us (a) > us (b) and us (X) is a nondegenerate
interval. This implies that there exists c 2 X such that
us (c) = us (b) +
1
3
(us (a)  us (b))
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and so jus (a)  us (c)j > jus (c)  us (b)j = jus (b)  us (c)j > 0 and simultaneously jut (a)  ut (c)j =
jut (b)  ut (c)j, which leads to
fa; cg s fb; cg and not fa; cg t fb; cg
a contradiction of Ease Consistency. Summing up, given any a; b 2 X, a s b () a t b.
Second, we show that, given any a 6= b and c 6= d in X, fa; bg t fc; dg =) fa; bg s fc; dg.
Assume per contra fa; bg t fc; dg but not fa; bg s fc; dg. It cannot be the case that fc; dg s fa; bg,
because by Ease Consistency, that would imply jut (c)  ut (d)j > jut (a)  ut (b)j and fa; bg t fc; dg
implies jut (a)  ut (b)j > jut (c)  ut (d)j. Then we have
jut (a)  ut (b)j > jut (c)  ut (d)j and jus (a)  us (b)j = jus (c)  us (d)j
Therefore jut (a)  ut (b)j > 0, and w.l.o.g. ut (a) > ut (b) (else exchange the roles of a and b). Since s
and t coincide, us (a) > us (b), and so
jus (c)  us (d)j = us (a)  us (b) > 0
ut (a)  ut (b) > jut (c)  ut (d)j > 0
where jut (c)  ut (d)j > 0 is true because ut (c) = ut (d) would imply us (c) = us (d). But then
ut (a) > ut (a)  jut (c)  ut (d)j > ut (b)
then there exists x 2 X such that
ut (a) > ut (x) = ut (a)  jut (c)  ut (d)j > ut (b)
Therefore
ut (a)  ut (x) = jut (c)  ut (d)j
but also
us (a) > us (x) > us (b)
thus  us (a) <  us (x) <  us (b), whence
0 < us (a)  us (x) < us (a)  us (b) = jus (c)  us (d)j
it follows jus (a)  us (x)j < jus (c)  us (d)j and jut (a)  ut (x)j = jut (c)  ut (d)j, that is,
fc; dg s fa; xg and not fc; dg t fa; xg
a contradiction of Ease Consistency. Summing up, given any a 6= b and c 6= d in X, fa; bg t fc; dg ()
fa; bg s fc; dg. As wanted.
2 implies 3. In fact, point 2 requires the coincidence of \s and \t, which, by Lemma 18 implies the
cardinal equivalence of us and ut.
3 implies 1. Is trivial. 
C Proofs of the results of Section 3
Given any function  : T ! (0;1), it is convenient for notational purposes to set
 (t) =
1
 (t)
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and, conversely, for any  : T ! (0;1) to set
 (t) =
1
 (t)
The convention  (0) =1 here corresponds to  (0) = 0.
Proof of Proposition 3 Set  = 1=, with  (0) = 0. Given any a; b 2 X, and any t in T0,
rt (a; b) =
e(t)u(a)+(a)
e(t)u(b)+(b)
= e(t)[u(a) u(b)]+(a) (b)
`t (a; b) =  (t) [u (a)  u (b)] +  (a)   (b)
ft (a; b) =
rt (a; b)
r0 (a; b)
= e(t)[u(a) u(b)]
wt (a; b) = ln ft (a; b) =  (t) [u (a)  u (b)]
also if a = b and if t = 0. Then, for each t 2 T ,
a t b def() wt (a; b) > 0 () u (a) > u (b)
(a; b) \t (c; d) def() wt (a; b) > wt (c; d) () u (a)  u (b) > u (c)  u (d)
fa; bg t fc; dg def() jwt (a; b)j > jwt (c; d)j () ju (a)  u (b)j > ju (c)  u (d)j
because  (t) > 0. 
Lemma 20 If a random choice process fptg is such that there exist u;  : X ! R and  : T ! (0;1) for
which
pt (a;A) =
e(t)u(a)+(a)P
b2A e
(t)u(b)+(b)
(26)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T0, then fptg is constant if and only if u is constant.
Moreover,
 if fptg is constant, u;  : X ! R and  : T ! (0;1) represent fptg in the sense of (26) if and only
if there exist k > 0 and h; l 2 R such that u = ku+ h and  = + l (there are no constraints on ).
 else, u;  : X ! R and  : T ! (0;1) represent fptg in the sense of (26) if and only if there exist
k > 0 and h; l 2 R such that u = ku+ h,  = + l, and  = =k.
Briey, u is cardinally unique,  is unique up to location, and  is unique given u unless fptg is constant.
In particular, when the process is not constant,  is unique up to scale: we can multiply  by a strictly
positive constant provided we divide u by the same constant.
Proof If u is constant, say u   2 R, then
pt (a;A) =
e(t)+(a)P
b2A e
(t)+(b)
=
e(a)P
b2A e
(b)
= p0 (a;A)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T0. Conversely, if
e(t)u(a)+(a)P
b2A e
(t)u(b)+(b)
= pt (a;A) = p0 (a;A) =
e(a)P
b2A e
(b)
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for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T0, then
 (t) [u (a)  u (b)] +  (a)   (b) = `t (a; b) = `0 (a; b) =  (a)   (b)
for all a; b 2 X and all t 2 T , and, since  (t) > 0, u (a)  u (b) = 0 follows.
As to uniqueness of u, , and , notice that, if also u, , and  represent fptg in the sense of (26),
then
e(a) (b) = r0 (a; b) = e(a) (b)
and
e(t)[u(a) u(b)]+(a) (b) = rt (a; b) = e
(t)[u(a) u(b)]+(a) (b)
for all a; b 2 X and all t 2 T . Therefore, arbitrarily choosing c 2 X, it follows  (a) =  (a) +
[ (c)   (c)] for all a 2 X, whence  = + l where l =  (c)   (c) is a constant. Hence,
 (t) [u (a)  u (b)] +  (a)   (b) =  (t) [u (a)  u (b)] +  (a)   (b)
=  (t) [u (a)  u (b)] +  (a)   (b)
and  (t) [u (a)  u (b)] =  (t) [u (a)  u (b)] for all a; b 2 X and all t 2 T . Arbitrarily choosing t 2 T and
b 2 X, it follows
u (a) =
 (t)
 (t)
[u (a)  u (b)] + u (b) = ku (a) + h 8a 2 X
with k > 0 and h 2 R. Cardinal uniqueness of u and uniqueness of  up to location follow. Moreover, if
fptg is not constant, then u is not constant either. Choosing a; b 2 X with u (a) 6= u (b), by what we have
just proved, it must be the case that
 (t) [u (a)  u (b)] =  (t) [u (a)  u (b)] =  (t) [ku (a)  ku (b)]
for all t 2 T ; so that  = =k if u = ku + h. This yields uniqueness of  given u, because if u = u, then
k = 1.
The converse is also true. In fact, if u = ku + h and  =  + l, with k > 0 and h; l 2 R, and we set
 = =k, it follows that
e
(t)
k
[ku(a)+h]+[(a)+l]P
b2A e
(t)
k
[ku(b)+h]+[(b)+l]
=
e(t)u(a)+
(t)
k
h+(a)elP
b2A e
(t)u(b)+
(t)
k
h+(b)el
=
e(t)u(a)+(a)el+
(t)
k
hP
b2A e
(t)u(b)+(b)el+
(t)
k
h
= pt (a;A)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T , thus, u, , and  represent fptg in the sense of (26).67 If in addition
fptg is constant, then u is constant and
e
~(t)[ku(a)+h]+[(a)+l]P
b2A e
~(t)[ku(b)+h]+[(b)+l]
=
e(a)P
b2A e
(b)
= p0 (a;A) = pt (a;A)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, all t 2 T , and any ~ : T ! (0;1). 
Both Proposition 4 and a characterization of constant processes follow immediately.
Proposition 21 Let fptg be a softmax process with utility u. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. fptg is nonconstant;
67Positivity of k guarantees positivity of .
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2. u is nonconstant;
3. there exist a^; b^ 2 X and t^ 2 T such that pt^(a^; b^) > p0(a^; b^).
Proof of Theorem 5 2 implies 3. Since fptg satises Positivity, the Choice Axiom, and Continuity,
by Theorem 1, for each t 2 T0, there exists a continuous vt : X ! R such that
pt (a;A) =
evt(a)P
b2A e
vt(b)
8a 2 A 2 A (27)
Arbitrarily choose c 2 X and replace each vt with vt   vt (c). With this, vt (c) = 0 for all t 2 T0 and (27)
still holds. Set  = v0 and ut = vt    = vt   v0 for all t 2 T . Clearly, the new vts, the uts, and  are
continuous and
ut (c) = vt (c)  v0 (c) = 0 8t 2 T
(also  (c) = 0). As in Section 3.1,
a t b () wt (a; b) > 0
fa; bg t fc; dg () et (a; b) > et (c; d)
for all t 2 T , a; b 2 X, and fa; bg ; fc; dg 2 A2. By (27), for all t 2 T and a; b 2 X,
wt (a; b) = `t (a; b)  `0 (a; b) = vt (a)  vt (b)  v0 (a) + v0 (b) = ut (a)  ut (b)
thus
a t b () ut (a) > ut (b)
fa; bg t fc; dg () jut (a)  ut (b)j > jut (c)  ut (d)j
But then X is a connected topological space, and (t;t ) and (s;s) are psychometric preferences
represented by ut and us for all s; t 2 T . As observed in the main text, Preference Consistency and Ease
Consistency imply that
a t b =) a s b
fa; bg s fc; dg =) fa; bg t fc; dg
for all s > t in T , a; b 2 X, and fa; bg ; fc; dg 2 A2; but then Corollary 19 guarantees that there exist
s;t > 0 and s;t 2 R such that
us = s;tut + s;t
In particular, all the uts are cardinally equivalent. Thus, arbitrarily choosing t^ 2 T and setting u = ut^, it
follows that, for every t 2 T , there exist  (t) > 0 and  (t) 2 R such that
ut =
ut^
 (t)
+  (t) =
u
 (t)
+  (t)
Moreover, for all t 2 T ,
0 = ut (c) =
ut^ (c)
 (t)
+  (t) =
0
 (t)
+  (t) =  (t)
and
vt = ut +  =
u
 (t)
+ 
so that point 3 follows from (27), because the case t = 0 follows suit.
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1 implies 3. Since fptg satises Positivity, the Choice Axiom, and Continuity, by Theorem 1, for each
t 2 T0, there exists a continuous vt : X ! R such that
pt (a;A) =
evt(a)P
b2A e
vt(b)
8a 2 A 2 A (28)
Arbitrarily choose c 2 X and replace each vt with vt   vt (c). With this, vt (c) = 0 for all t 2 T0 and (28)
still holds. Set  = v0 and ut = vt    = vt   v0 for all t 2 T . Clearly, the new vts, the uts, and  are
continuous and
ut (c) = vt (c)  v0 (c) = 0 8t 2 T
(also  (c) = 0). Dene, like in Section 3.1,
(a; b) \t (c; d) () wt (a; b) > wt (c; d)
for all t 2 T and (a; b) ; (c; d) 2 X26=. By (28), for all t 2 T and a; b 2 X,
wt (a; b) = `t (a; b)  `0 (a; b) = vt (a)  vt (b)  v0 (a) + v0 (b) = ut (a)  ut (b)
thus
(a; b) \t (c; d) () ut (a)  ut (b) > ut (c)  ut (d)
But then X is a connected topological space, and \t and \s are preference intensities represented by ut
and us for all s; t 2 T . As observed in the main text, Intensity Consistency is equivalent to
(a; b) \t (c; d) () (a; b) \s (c; d)
for all s > t in T and (a; b) ; (c; d) 2 X26=; but then Corollary 19 guarantees that there exist s;t > 0 and
s;t 2 R such that
us = s;tut + s;t
Point 3 follows by the argument we used above.
The rest of the proof is routine (for uniqueness see Lemma 20). 
Proof of Proposition 6 Setting  = 1=, with  (0) = 0,
pt (a;A) =
e(t)u(a)+(a)P
b2A e
(t)u(b)+(b)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T0. If pt^(a^; b^) > p0(a^; b^) for some a^; b^ 2 X and t^ 2 T , then a^ t^ b^, and
0 < wt^(a^; b^) = 
 
t^
 h
u (a^)  u(b^)
i
thus  = u (a^)  u(b^) > 0, because   t^ > 0. Therefore, if we set
^ (t) = wt(a^; b^) =  (t) 8t 2 T
we obtain a function ^ : T ! (0;1). Analogously
u^ (x) =
wt^(x; b^)
wt^(a^; b^)
=

 
t^
 h
u (x)  u(b^)
i

 
t^


=
u (x)  u(b^)

8x 2 X
and
^ (x) = `0(x; b^) =  (x)  (b^) 8x 2 X
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dene two functions u^; ^ : X ! R. Finally, for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T ,
e^(t)u^(a)+^(a)P
b2A e
^(t)u^(b)+^(b)
=
exp
h
^ (t) u^ (a) + ^ (a)
i
P
b2A exp
h
^ (t) u^ (b) + ^ (b)
i
=
exp
"
 (t)
u (a)  u(b^)

+  (a)  (b^)
#
P
b2A exp
"
 (t)
u (b)  u(b^)

+  (b)  (b^)
#
=
exp
h
 (t)u (a)   (t)u(b^) +  (a)  (b^)
i
P
b2A exp
h
 (t)u (b)   (t)u(b^) +  (b)  (b^)
i
=
e(t)u(a)+(a)e [(t)u(b^)+(b^)]P
b2A e
(t)u(b)+(b)e [(t)u(b^)+(b^)]
= pt (a;A)
and the same is true for t = 0. 
Proposition 22 Let u;  : X ! R and
pt (a;A) =
etu(a)+(a)P
b2A e
tu(b)+(b)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 [0;1). Then
ps (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A)  pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) 8h 2 R
for all s > t in (0;1) and all A 2 A.
Proof Arbitrarily choose A 2 A, h 2 R, and set [u > h] = fc 2 A : u (c) > hg. If [u > h] = ?, then
pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) = pt (?; A) = 0 8t 2 (0;1)
hence
ps (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) = pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A)
for all s > t in (0;1). Analogously, if [u > h] = A, then
pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) = pt (A;A) = 1 8t 2 (0;1)
hence
ps (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) = pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A)
for all s > t in (0;1). Else ? ( [u > h] ( A. If we prove that, in this case, it holds
d
dt
pt ([u > h] ; A) > 0 8t 2 (0;1) (29)
then the statement follows. In fact, (29) implies that the function
p ([u > h] ; A) : T ! [0; 1]
t 7! pt ([u > h] ; A)
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is strictly increasing on (0;1).
Next we show that (29) holds. Notice that ? ( [u > h] ( A implies [u  h] is not empty. Given any
t 2 (0;1), with the abbreviation P
u(c)>h
=
P
c2A:u(c)>h
, we have
0 <
d
dt
0BB@
P
u(c)>h
etu(c)+(c)P
b2A
etu(b)+(b)
1CCA =
 P
b2A
etu(b)+(b)
! P
u(c)>h
u (c) etu(c)+(c)   P
u(c)>h
etu(c)+(c)
 P
b2A
u (b) etu(b)+(b)
!
 P
b2A
etu(b)+(b)
!2
()
P
u(c)>h
etu(c)+(c)
 P
u(b)>h
u (b) etu(b)+(b) +
P
u(b)h
u (b) etu(b)+(b)
!
<
0@ P
u(b)>h
etu(b)+(b) +
X
u(b)h
etu(b)+(b)
1A P
u(c)>h
u (c) etu(c)+(c)
()X
u(c)>h
etu(c)+(c)
X
u(b)h
u (b) etu(b)+(b) <
X
u(b)h
etu(b)+(b)
X
u(c)>h
u (c) etu(c)+(c)
after re-lettering, this is equivalent toX
u(c)h
u (c) etu(c)+(c)
X
u(b)>h
etu(b)+(b) <
X
u(c)>h
u (c) etu(c)+(c)
X
u(b)h
etu(b)+(b)
P
u(c)h
u (c) etu(c)+(c)P
u(b)h
etu(b)+(b)
<
P
u(c)>h
u (c) etu(c)+(c)P
u(b)>h
etu(b)+(b)
X
u(c)h
u (c)
0B@ etu(c)+(c)P
u(b)h
etu(b)+(b)
1CA < X
u(c)>h
u (c)
0B@ etu(c)+(c)P
u(b)>h
etu(b)+(b)
1CA
X
c2[uh]
u (c) pt (c; [u  h]) <
X
c2[u>h]
u (c) pt (c; [u > h])
and this concludes the proof, because the l.h.s. is an average (i.e., a convex combination) of values
u (c)  h, so it is not greater than h itself, the r.h.s. is an average of values u (c) > h, so it is strictly
greater than h itself. 
Proof of Proposition 7 By Proposition 21, u is nonconstant.
1 implies 4. Given any s; t 2 T0 and a; b 2 X, we have
ps (a; b)  pt (a; b) () rs (a; b)  rt (a; b) () e
u(a) u(b)
(s)
+(a) (b)  eu(a) u(b)(t) +(a) (b)
()  (t) [u (a)  u (b)]   (s) [u (a)  u (b)]
Now given s > t in T , arbitrarily choose a; b 2 X such that u (a) > u (b). Direct computation of pt (a; b)
yields
pt (a; b) > p0 (a; b)
Decreasing Error Rate then implies ps (a; b)  pt (a; b) and
 (t) [u (a)  u (b)]   (s) [u (a)  u (b)]
that is,  (t)   (s).
4 implies 3. Let s > t in T and observe that  (s)   (t). Consider
ql (a;A) =
elu(a)+(a)P
b2A e
lu(b)+(b)
8a 2 A 2 A
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for all l 2 [0;1). By Proposition 22, it follows that, for every A 2 A, if l  l0, then
ql (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A)  ql0 (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) 8h 2 R
Now, taking l = 1= (s) and l0 = 1= (t), decreasing monotonicity of  guarantees that l  l0, and we have
q1=(s) (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A)  q1=(t) (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) 8h 2 R
ps (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A)  pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) 8h 2 R
that is, Payo¤ Stochastic Dominance holds.
3 implies 2. Given any A 2 A and any s > t in T , by Payo¤ Stochastic Dominance,
ps (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A)  pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > hg ; A) 8h 2 R
but then, for all b 2 A, taking h = u (b), it follows
ps (fa 2 A : u (a) > u (b)g ; A)  pt (fa 2 A : u (a) > u (b)g ; A) 8b 2 A
but
w (c; d) = ln
r (c; d)
r0 (c; d)
=
u (c)  u (d)
 ()
8c; d 2 A 8 2 T (30)
and since c  d if and only if w (c; d) > 0, it follows c  d if and only if u (c) > u (d); therefore
ps (fa 2 A : a s bg ; A)  pt (fa 2 A : a t bg ; A) 8b 2 A
2 implies 1. By (30), given any c; d 2 X and  2 T ,
p (c; d) > p0 (c; d) () c  d () w (c; d) > 0 () u (c) > u (d)
Let s > t and a; b 2 X be such that pt (a; b)  p0 (a; b). If pt (a; b) = p0 (a; b), then u (a) = u (b), hence
ps (a; b) = p0 (a; b) = pt (a; b). Else pt (a; b) > p0 (a; b) and u (a) > u (b). Point 2 guarantees that
ps (fx 2 fa; bg : x s bg ; fa; bg)  pt (fx 2 fa; bg : x t bg ; fa; bg)
and, since u represents both s and t, it follows that fx 2 fa; bg : x s bg = fx 2 fa; bg : x t bg = fag,
therefore ps (a; b)  pt (a; b) and Decreasing Error Rate holds. 
Proof of Proposition 8 By Proposition 7, as t ! 1,  (t) decreases to some . Let a 6= b in X. If
 > 0, then
p1 (a; b) = lim
t!1
pt (a; b) =
1
1 + e
u(b) u(a)
 +(b) (a)
2 (0; 1)
By Asymptotic Tie-breaking,
1
1 + e
u(b) u(a)
 +(b) (a)
= p1 (a; b) = p0 (a; b) =
1
1 + e(b) (a)
which contradicts  > 0. We conclude that  = 0. In turn, given any a 2 A, this implies
p1 (a;A) = lim
(t)!0
e
u(a)
(t)
+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
+(b)
= lim
!1
eu(a)+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)+(b)
= lim
!1
1X
fb2A:u(b)>u(a)g
e[u(b) u(a)]+(b) (a)| {z }
!1 if there exists b2A such that u(b)>u(a)
+
X
fb2A:u(b)u(a)g
e[u(b) u(a)]+(b) (a)| {z }
!Pfb2A:u(b)=u(a)g e(b) (a)
so:
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 if a =2 argmaxA u, then there exists b 2 A such that u (b) > u (a), and so
p1 (a;A) =
1
1+Pfb2A:u(b)=u(a)g e(b) (a) = 0 = argmaxA u (a) e
(a)P
b2argmaxA u e
(b)
 else, there does not exist b 2 A such that u (b) > u (a), u (a) = maxA u, and
p1 (a;A) =
1P
fb2A:u(b)=u(a)g e
(b) (a) =
1P
b2argmaxA u e
(b) (a)
=
e(a)P
b2argmaxA u e
(b)
= argmaxA u (a)
e(a)P
b2argmaxA u e
(b)
as desired.
Let a 6= b in X. If u (a) > u (b), then argmaxfa;bg u = fag, hence
p1 (a; b) = fag (a)
e(a)
e(a)
= 1
Conversely, if u (a)  u (b), there are two possibilities:
 either u (b) > u (a), then argmaxfa;bg u = fbg, hence
p1 (a; b) = fbg (a)
e(a)
e(b)
= 0 6= 1
 or u (a) = u (b), then argmaxfa;bg u = fa; bg, hence
p1 (a; b) = fa;bg (a)
e(a)
e(a) + e(b)
=
e(a)
e(a) + e(b)
2 (0; 1)
in any case, p1 (a; b) 6= 1; and so if p1 (a; b) = 1 it must be the case that u (a) > u (b). 
D Discrete choice analysis
Recall that Ease Consistency requires in an ordinal way that the di¢ culty of decision problem fa; bg
relative to decision problem fc; dg is inherent to the alternatives involved and independent of deliberation
times. The same requirement can be made cardinal:
Constant Relative Ease of Comparison Given any s > t in T ,
et (a; b)
et (c; d)
=
es (a; b)
es (c; d)
for all a; b; c; d 2 X such that either ratio is well dened.
Theorem 23 A random choice process fptg satises Positivity, the Choice Axiom, Preference Con-
sistency, and Constant Relative Ease of Comparison if and only if there exist u;  : X ! R and
 : T ! (0;1) such that
pt (a;A) =
e
u(a)
(t)
+(a)P
b2A e
u(b)
(t)
+(b)
(31)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T0.
In this case, u is cardinally unique,  is unique up to location, and  is unique given u unless fptg is
constant.
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Inspection of the proofs strategy shows that Constant Relative Ease of Comparison can be replaced
with
Constant Relative Weight of Evidence Given any s > t in T ,
wt (a; b)
wt (c; d)
=
ws (a; b)
ws (c; d)
for all a; b; c; d 2 X such that either ratio is well dened.
Which has a very similar interpretation.
Inspection of the following proofs shows that, in order to apply these results to any index set T , not
necessarily a subset of (0;1), it is su¢ cient to replace the inequality > appearing in the axioms with the
weaker inequality 6=. Actually this replacement makes the axioms easier to test on the empirical side.
Finally, Proposition 6 holds unchanged.
D.1 Proofs
Recall that `t (a; c)  `0 (a; c) = wt (a; c) is the weight of evidence, and note that Constant Relative Weight
of Evidence implies:
Log-odds Ratio Invariance Given any s > t in T ,
`t (a; c)  `0 (a; c)
`t (b; c)  `0 (b; c) =
`s (a; c)  `0 (a; c)
`s (b; c)  `0 (b; c)
for all a; b; c 2 X such that either ratio is well dened.
Lemma 24 A random choice process fptg satises Positivity, the Choice Axiom, Preference Consistency,
and Log-odds Ratio Invariance if and only if there exist u;  : X ! R and  : T ! (0;1) such that
pt (a;A) =
e(t)u(a)+(a)P
b2A e
(t)u(b)+(b)
(32)
for all A 2 A, all a 2 A, and all t 2 T0.
Proof Only if. Since fptg satises Positivity and the Choice Axiom, by Theorem 1, for each t 2 T0, there
exists vt : X ! R such that
pt (a;A) =
evt(a)P
b2A e
vt(b)
8a 2 A 2 A (33)
Arbitrarily choose c 2 X and replace each vt with vt   vt (c). With this, vt (c) = 0 for all t 2 T0 and (33)
still holds. Set  = v0 and ut = vt    = vt   v0 for all t 2 T . Clearly,
ut (c) = vt (c)  v0 (c) = 0 8t 2 T
(also  (c) = 0).
Note that, for all t 2 T and all x 2 X,
wt (x; c) = `t (x; c)  `0 (x; c) = vt (x)  vt (c)  v0 (x) + v0 (c) = vt (x)   (x) = ut (x) (34)
If ut is constant for all t 2 T , then ut  ut (c) = 0, and
pt (a;A) =
evt(a)P
b2A e
vt(b)
=
eut(a)+(a)P
b2A e
ut(b)+(b)
=
e(a)P
b2A e
(b)
= p0 (a;A) 8a 2 A 2 A
51
thus (32) holds (e.g., with u  0). Otherwise, there exists t 2 T such that ut is not constant, so that
ut
 
b
 6= 0 = ut (c) for some b 2 X. This implies that
`t (a; c)  `0 (a; c)
`t
 
b; c
  `0  b; c = ut (a)ut  b
is a well dened real number for all a 2 X. By Log-odds Ratio Invariance,
`t (a; c)  `0 (a; c)
`t
 
b; c
  `0  b; c
is well dened too for all t 2 T , and
ut (a)
ut
 
b
 = `t (a; c)  `0 (a; c)
`t
 
b; c
  `0  b; c = `t (a; c)  `0 (a; c)`t  b; c  `0  b; c = ut (a)ut  b 2 R 8 (a; t) 2 X  T
Therefore, ut
 
b
 6= 0 = ut (c) for all t 2 T , and
ut (a) =
ut
 
b

ut
 
b
ut (a) 8 (a; t) 2 X  T (35)
Consider the case in which ut
 
b

> 0 = ut (c). If t > t, then, by (34) and Preference Consistency, we have
ut
 
b

> 0 =) wt
 
b; c

> 0 =) wt
 
b; c

> 0 =) ut
 
b

> 0
thus ut
 
b

=ut
 
b

> 0. This is clearly true also if t = t. Else t < t, assume per contra ut
 
b

< 0, then, by
(34) and Preference Consistency, we have
ut
 
b

< 0 =) wt
 
b; c

< 0 =)  wt
 
b; c

> 0
=) wt
 
c;b

> 0 =) wt
 
c;b

> 0 =)  wt
 
c;b

< 0
=) wt
 
b; c

< 0 =) ut
 
b

< 0
a contradiction. Thus ut
 
b

=ut
 
b

> 0 holds for all t 2 T provided ut
 
b

> 0.
Consider the case in which ut
 
b

< 0 = ut (c). If t > t, then, by (34) and Preference Consistency, we
have
ut
 
b

< 0 =) wt
 
b; c

< 0 =) wt
 
c;b

> 0
=) wt
 
c;b

> 0 =) wt
 
b; c

< 0
=) ut
 
b

< 0
thus ut
 
b

=ut
 
b

> 0. This is clearly true also if t = t. Else t < t, assume per contra ut
 
b

> 0, then, by
(34) and Preference Consistency, we have
ut
 
b

> 0 =) wt
 
b; c

> 0 =) wt
 
b; c

> 0 =) ut
 
b

> 0
a contradiction. Thus ut
 
b

=ut
 
b

> 0 holds for all t 2 T provided ut
 
b

< 0.
This shows that
 : T ! (0;1)
t 7! ut(b)
ut(b)
is well dened. Moreover, the function u = ut : X ! R is nonconstant and relation (35) implies
ut (a) =
ut
 
b

ut
 
b
ut (a) =  (t)u (a) 8 (a; t) 2 X  T
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which together with (33) and the relation vt = ut +  (for all t 2 T ) shows that the axioms imply
representation (32); because the case t = 0 follows suit.
If. It is easy to verify that the converse implication holds too. For the sake of completeness, we check
that representation (32) implies Log-odds Ratio Invariance. Let t; s 2 T and a; b; c; x; y 2 X. Notice that
wt (x; y) = `t (x; y)  `0 (x; y) = ln e
(t)u(x)+(x)
e(t)u(y)+(y)
  ln e
(x)
e(y)
=  (t)u (x) +  (x)   (t)u (y)   (y)   (x) +  (y)
=  (t) [u (x)  u (y)]
so that
wt (x; y) = 0 ()  (t) [u (x)  u (y)] = 0 () u (x) = u (y)
because  (t) > 0. The same considerations hold with s in place of t. Assume ws (a; c) =ws (b; c) is well
dened:
 If ws (b; c) = 0, then ws (a; c) 6= 0, u (b) = u (c), and u (a) 6= u (c); therefore:
 ws (a; c)
ws (b; c)
=
 (s) [u (a)  u (c)]
0
=
u (a)  u (c)
0
, because  (s) > 0,
 wt (b; c) =  (t) [u (b)  u (c)] = 0, because u (b) = u (c),
 wt (a; c) =  (t) [u (a)  u (c)] 6= 0, because u (a) 6= u (c), and since  (t) > 0, then
wt (a; c)
wt (b; c)
=
 (t) [u (a)  u (c)]
0
=
u (a)  u (c)
0
=
ws (a; c)
ws (b; c)
 Else ws (b; c) 6= 0, then u (b) 6= u (c) and wt (b; c) =  (t) [u (b)  u (c)] 6= 0, so that
ws (a; c)
ws (b; c)
=
 (s) [u (a)  u (c)]
 (s) [u (b)  u (c)] =
u (a)  u (c)
u (b)  u (c) =
 (t) [u (a)  u (c)]
 (t) [u (b)  u (c)] =
wt (a; c)
wt (b; c)
The case in which wt (a; c) =wt (b; c) is well dened is analogous. 
Lemma 25 If a random choice process fptg satises Positivity, the Choice Axiom, and Preference Con-
sistency, then it satises Log-odds Ratio Invariance if and only if it satises Constant Relative Ease of
Comparison.
Proof Since fptg satises Positivity and the Choice Axiom, by Theorem 1, for each t 2 T0, there exists
vt : X ! R such that
pt (a;A) =
evt(a)P
b2A e
vt(b)
8a 2 A 2 A (36)
Arbitrarily choose c 2 X and replace each vt with vt   vt (c). With this, vt (c) = 0 for all t 2 T0 and (36)
still holds. Set  = v0 and ut = vt    = vt   v0 for all t 2 T . Clearly,
ut (c) = vt (c)  v0 (c) = 0 8t 2 T
(also  (c) = 0). By (36), for all t 2 T and a; b 2 X,
wt (a; b) = `t (a; b)  `0 (a; b) = vt (a)  vt (b)  v0 (a) + v0 (b) = ut (a)  ut (b) =  wt (b; a)
thus and
et (a; b) = jut (a)  ut (b)j
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These relations will be repeatedly used during the proof.
If fptg satises Log-odds Ratio Invariance, by Lemma 24, there exist u;  : X ! R and  : T ! (0;1)
such that
vt (a) =  (t)u (a) +  (a)
for all a 2 X and all t 2 T0.
Let t; s 2 T and a; b; c; d; x; y 2 X. Notice that, since  (t) > 0, then
et (x; y) = jvt (x)  vt (y)  [v0 (x)  v0 (y)]j
= j (t)u (x) +  (x)   (t)u (y)   (y)   (x) +  (y)j
=  (t) ju (x)  u (y)j
and so et (x; y) = 0 if and only if u (x) = u (y). The same considerations hold with s in place of t.
Assume es (a; b) =es (c; d) is well dened. Then it cannot be the case that both u (a)   u (b) and
u (c)  u (d) are simultaneously zero. If u (c) = u (d), then u (a) 6= u (b) and
es (a; b)
es (c; d)
=
 (s) ju (a)  u (b)j
0
=1 =  (t) ju (a)  u (b)j
0
=
et (a; b)
et (c; d)
Else u (c) 6= u (d) and
es (a; b)
es (c; d)
=
 (s) ju (a)  u (b)j
 (s) ju (c)  u (d)j =
ju (a)  u (b)j
ju (c)  u (d)j =
 (t) ju (a)  u (b)j
 (t) ju (c)  u (d)j =
et (a; b)
et (c; d)
The case in which et (a; b) =et (c; d) is well dened is analogous.
Therefore Log-odds Ratio Invariance implies Constant Relative Ease of Comparison.
Conversely, assume that fptg satises Constant Relative Ease of Comparison and that one of the ratios
`t (a; c)  `0 (a; c)
`t (b; c)  `0 (b; c) =
wt (a; c)
wt (b; c)
or
`s (a; c)  `0 (a; c)
`s (b; c)  `0 (b; c) =
ws (a; c)
ws (b; c)
is well dened for some a; b; c 2 X and some s > t in T . If ws (a; c) =ws (b; c) is well dened, then it cannot
be the case that both us (a)  us (c) and us (b)  us (c) are simultaneously zero. If us (b)  us (c) = 0, then
either us (a) > us (c) or us (a) < us (c). Moreover, by Preference Consistency, it must be the case that
ut (b)  ut (c) = 0,68 and since
es (a; c)
es (b; c)
=
jus (a)  us (c)j
jus (b)  us (c)j
is well dened, by Constant Relative Ease of Comparison, also
et (a; c)
et (b; c)
=
jut (a)  ut (c)j
jut (b)  ut (c)j
is well dened and it must hold
jus (a)  us (c)j
jus (b)  us (c)j =
jut (a)  ut (c)j
jut (b)  ut (c)j
68In fact, by Preference Consistency, if s > t, then, given any x; y 2 X,
wt (x; y) > 0 =) ws (x; y) > 0
ut (x)  ut (y) > 0 =) us (x)  us (y) > 0
ut (y)  ut (x) < 0 =) us (y)  us (x) < 0
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Summing up: us (b)  us (c) = ut (b)  ut (c) = 0, and
jut (a)  ut (c)j
jut (b)  ut (c)j =
jus (a)  us (c)j
jus (b)  us (c)j =1
then either ut (a) > ut (c) or ut (c) > ut (a); by Preference Consistency, in the former case we have
us (a) > us (c) and
wt (a; c)
wt (b; c)
=
ut (a)  ut (c)
0
=1 = us (a)  us (c)
0
=
ws (a; c)
ws (b; c)
in the latter case we have us (c) > us (a) and
wt (a; c)
wt (b; c)
=
ut (a)  ut (c)
0
=  1 = us (a)  us (c)
0
=
ws (a; c)
ws (b; c)
Else if us (b)  us (c) 6= 0, then
es (a; c)
es (b; c)
=
jus (a)  us (c)j
jus (b)  us (c)j
is well dened and nite, so is
et (a; c)
et (b; c)
=
jut (a)  ut (c)j
jut (b)  ut (c)j
and it must hold jus (a)  us (c)j
jus (b)  us (c)j =
jut (a)  ut (c)j
jut (b)  ut (c)j
But then ut (b)   ut (c) 6= 0, and if ut (b)   ut (c) ? 0, by Preference Consistency, us (b)   us (c) ? 0.
Therefore jus (a)  us (c)j
 (us (b)  us (c)) =
jut (a)  ut (c)j
 (ut (b)  ut (c))
Now, if ut (a)  ut (c) = 0, then us (a)  us (c) = 0 and
us (a)  us (c)
 (us (b)  us (c)) =
ut (a)  ut (c)
 (ut (b)  ut (c))
else if ut (a)  ut (c) > 0, by Preference Consistency, us (a)  us (c) > 0 and
us (a)  us (c)
 (us (b)  us (c)) =
ut (a)  ut (c)
 (ut (b)  ut (c))
else, ut (a)  ut (c) < 0, by Preference Consistency, us (a)  us (c) < 0 and
  (us (a)  us (c))
 (us (b)  us (c)) =
  (ut (a)  ut (c))
 (ut (b)  ut (c))
In any case,
ws (a; c)
ws (b; c)
=
us (a)  us (c)
us (b)  us (c) =
ut (a)  ut (c)
ut (b)  ut (c) =
wt (a; c)
wt (b; c)
So far we proved that, under Constant Relative Ease of Comparison, if ws (a; c) =ws (b; c) is well dened,
then wt (a; c) =wt (b; c) is also well dened, and the two ratios coincide. Now assume that wt (a; c) =wt (b; c)
is well dened. Then et (a; c) =et (b; c) = jwt (a; c)j = jwt (b; c)j is well dened as well; by Constant Relative
Ease of Comparison, es (a; c) =es (b; c) = jws (a; c)j = jws (b; c)j is well dened too, then ws (a; c) =ws (b; c) is
not 0=0. By the previous argument, we have
ws (a; c)
ws (b; c)
=
wt (a; c)
wt (b; c)
In conclusion, Log-odds Ratio Invariance holds. 
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E Proofs of the results of Section 4
Let v : A ! R,  > 0, and a 6= b in A be given and xed; set  = v (a)   v (b). In this way, when
DDM(v; ; ) is considered, the ex post (binary) probability of accepting proposal a over incumbent b is
P (a; b) = P (COa;b = a) =
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
1  e 2[v(a) v(b)] (37)
with the limit convention
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
1  e 2[v(a) v(b)] =
a;b + 
2
(38)
if v (a) = v (b).69 This number is uniquely determined by the value a;b of  at (a; b).
Fact 1 P (a; b) 2 (0; 1) for all a;b 2 ( ; ).
Proof If  6= 0, then
 P (COa;b = a) = 0 ()
1  e (a;b+)
1  e 2 = 0 () 1 = e
 (a;b+) () a;b +  = 0 () a;b =  
which is excluded by a;b 2 ( ; );
 P (COa;b = a) = 1 ()
1  e (a;b+) = 1  e 2 () e (a;b+) = e 2
() a;b +  = 2 () a;b = 
which is excluded by a;b 2 ( ; ).
Else  = 0 and P (COa;b = a) 2 f0; 1g if and only if
a;b + 
2
2 f0; 1g () a;b +  2 f0; 2g () a;b 2 f ; g
which, again, is excluded by a;b 2 ( ; ). 
Fact 2 If a;b; b;a 2 ( ; ) are such that a;b =  b;a, then P (a; b) = 1  P (b; a).
Proof First we show that a;b =  b;a implies that P (COa;b = a) = P (COb;a = a). That is, the DDM-
induced probability of accepting proposal a over incumbent b coincides with the DDM-induced probability
of rejecting proposal b over incumbent a, when a;b =  b;a.
If  6= 0, then
P (COa;b = a) = P (COb;a = a) () P (COa;b = a) = 1  P (COb;a = b)
1  e (a;b+)
1  e 2 = 1 
1  e(b;a+)
1  e2 ()
1  e (a;b+)
1  e 2 =
1  e2   1 + e(b;a+)
1  e2
1  e (a;b+)
1  e 2 =
 e2 + e(b;a+)
1  e2 ()
1  e (a;b+)
1  e 2 =
 1 + e(b;a+) 2
e 2   1
1  e (a;b+) = 1  e(b;a+) 2 () e (a;b+) = e(b;a+) 2
 a;b    = b;a    () a;b =  b;a
69See, e.g., Pinsky and Karlin (2011, Theorem 8.1).
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which is the hypothesis.
Else
P (COa;b = a) = P (COb;a = a) () P (COa;b = a) = 1  P (COb;a = b)
a;b + 
2
= 1  b;a + 
2
() a;b +  = 2   (b;a + )
a;b +  =  b;a +  () a;b =  b;a
which is the hypothesis.
But then
P (a; b) = P (COa;b = a) = P (COb;a = a) = 1  P (COb;a = b) = 1  P (b; a)
as wanted. 
Fact 3 For all scalars x; y > 0 and z; w 6= 0,
x
y
=
z
w
() x
x+ y
=
z
z + w
() y
x+ y
=
w
z + w
Proof Notice that x; y > 0 excludes y=x =  1, then
x
y
=
z
w
() y
x
=
w
z
() 1
1 + y
x
=
1
1 + w
z
() x
x+ y
=
z
z + w
() 1  x
x+ y
= 1  z
z + w
() x+ y   x
x+ y
=
z + w   z
z + w
() y
x+ y
=
w
z + w
as wanted. 
Proposition 26 If a;b; b;a 2 ( ; ) are such that a;b =  b;a, then the following conditions are equiva-
lent for  2 R:
1. P (a; b) =
ev(a)
ev(a) + (1  ) ev(b) ;
2.
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
= e[v(a) v(b)]

1   ;
3.  =
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b)P (b; a)
.
Proof If  satises the second equation, then neither  nor 1   can be zero because Fact 1 requires that
P (a; b) =P (b; a) =2 f0;1g, and
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
=
ev(a)
(1  ) ev(b)
But P (a; b) ;P (b; a) > 0 and ev(a); (1  ) ev(b) 6= 0, then, by Fact 3,
P (a; b)
P (a; b) + P (b; a)
=
ev(a)
ev(a) + (1  ) ev(b)
57
which, since P (a; b) + P (b; a) = 1 by Fact 2, is equivalent to
P (a; b) =
ev(a)
ev(a) + (1  ) ev(b)
the rst equation.
Conversely, if  satises the rst equation, then neither  nor 1   can be zero because Fact 1 requires
that P (a; b) =2 f0; 1g, and since, by Fact 2, P (a; b) + P (b; a) = 1, it follows
P (a; b)
P (a; b) + P (b; a)
=
ev(a)
ev(a) + (1  ) ev(b)
But P (a; b) ;P (b; a) > 0 and ev(a); (1  ) ev(b) 6= 0, then, by Fact 3,  satises the second equation.
If  satises the second equation (and so neither  nor 1   are zero), then
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(b)P (b; a)
=

1  
But e v(a)P (a; b) ; e v(b)P (b; a) > 0 and ; 1   6= 0, then, by Fact 3,
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b)P (b; a)
=

 + (1  ) = 
the third equation.
Conversely, if  satises the third equation, then  and 1   cannot be zero because
 =
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b)P (b; a)
2 (0; 1)
and the third equation can be written as
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b)P (b; a)
=

 + (1  )
But e v(a)P (a; b) ; e v(b)P (b; a) > 0 and ; 1   6= 0, then, by Fact 3,
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(b)P (b; a)
=

1  
and so
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
=
ev(a)
(1  ) ev(b)
that is,  satises the second equation. 
This shows the equivalence of Equations (15), (16), and (17).
The Gibbs ex ante (binary) probability is dened by (17) as
 (a; b) =
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b)P (b; a)
and it is such that
 (a; b) +  (b; a) = 1
Moreover, the maintained assumption a;b =  b;a, on the initial condition, makes (17) equivalent to
 (a; b) =
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b) (1  P (a; b))
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which allows to see  (a; b) as a function of a;b only.70 This means that
Ga;b : ( ; ) ! (0; 1)
a;b 7!  (a; b)
is well dened and explicitly given by
Ga;b (a;b) =
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b) (1  P (a; b))
=
1
1 + e[v(a) v(b)]
1  P (a; b)
P (a; b)
=
1
1 + e[v(a) v(b)]
e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]   e 2[v(a) v(b)]
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
=
1
1 +
e a;b[v(a) v(b)]   e [v(a) v(b)]
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
Next we prove Proposition 9 and the fact that Ga;b is a bona de bijection.
Proof of Proposition 9 Arbitrarily choose  (a; b) 2 (0; 1).
If v (a) 6= v (b), then
Ga;b (a;b) =  (a; b) ()  (a; b) = 1
1 +
e a;b[v(a) v(b)]   e [v(a) v(b)]
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
(setting  (b; a) = 1   (a; b) ) ()  (a; b)
 (a; b) +  (b; a)
=
1
1 +
e a;b[v(a) v(b)]   e [v(a) v(b)]
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
() 1
1 +
 (b; a)
 (a; b)
=
1
1 +
e a;b[v(a) v(b)]   e [v(a) v(b)]
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
()  (a; b)
 (b; a)
=
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
e a;b[v(a) v(b)]   e [v(a) v(b)]
Recalling  = v (a)  v (b) 6= 0 and setting  = ln  (a; b) = (b; a), we have:
Ga;b (a;b) =  (a; b) () 1  e
 (a;b+)
e a;b   e  = e
 () 1  e (a;b+) = e a;b   e 
() e  + 1 = e a;b + e a;b  () e a;b = e
  + 1
e + e 
() a;b =  1

ln
e  + 1
e + e 
() a;b =  1

ln
1
e 
e  + 1
e+ + 1
() a;b =  1


 + ln
e  + 1
e+ + 1

() a;b =   + 1

ln
e+ + 1
e  + 1
That is,
a;b =   + 1
v (a)  v (b) ln
(a;b)
(b;a)
e[v(a) v(b)] + 1
(a;b)
(b;a)
e [v(a) v(b)] + 1
(39)
70Instead of as a function of  (for v,  and (a; b) given).
59
or
a;b

=
1
 [v (a)  v (b)] ln
 (a;b)
(b;a)
e[v(a) v(b)] + 1
(a;b)
(b;a)
e [v(a) v(b)] + 1
!
  1 (40)
Dene g : R2 ! R by
g (x; y) =
1
x
ln

eyex + 1
eye x + 1

  1
with the limit convention
g (0; y) = lim
x!0

1
x
ln

eyex + 1
eye x + 1

  1

= 2
ey
ey + 1
  1
By (40),
Ga;b (a;b) =  (a; b) () a;b = g

 [v (a)  v (b)] ; ln  (a; b)
1   (a; b)

(41)
if v (a) 6= v (b).
Else if v (a) = v (b), then
Ga;b (a;b) =  (a; b) ()  (a; b) = e
 v(a)P (a; b)
e v(a)P (a; b) + e v(b) (1  P (a; b))
 
= P (a; b)

 (a; b) =
a;b + 
2
() a;b = 2 (a; b)   () a;b =  (2 (a; b)  1)
() a;b = 

2
eln(a;b)=(b;a)
eln(a;b)=(b;a) + 1
  1

() a;b = g

 [v (a)  v (b)] ; ln  (a; b)
1   (a; b)

Hence (41) holds also if v (a) = v (b).
So far we have shown that, given any  (a; b) 2 (0; 1),
Ga;b (a;b) =  (a; b) () a;b = g

 [v (a)  v (b)] ; ln  (a; b)
1   (a; b)

Since g takes values in ( 1; 1), for every  (a; b) 2 (0; 1) there exists one and only one a;b 2 ( ; ) such
that Ga;b (a;b) =  (a; b). Then the Gibbs binary bijection is a genuine bijection.
Moreover, for each x 2 R,
gx : R ! ( 1; 1)
y 7! g (x; y)
is such that gx (y) ? 0 if and only if y ? 0. Then, given any a;b 2 ( ; ),
Ga;b (a;b) ?
1
2
() ln Ga;b (a;b)
1 Ga;b (a;b) ? 0
() g

 [v (a)  v (b)] ; ln Ga;b (a;b)
1 Ga;b (a;b)

? 0
() a;b ? 0
The proof is concluded by observing thatP (a; b)   (a; b) =   (a; b) ev(a) (a; b) ev(a) +  (b; a) ev(b)    (a; b) (a; b) +  (b; a)

=
 11 + (b;a)(a;b)e[v(b) v(a)]  
1
1 + 
(b;a)
(a;b)

=
 11 + e[v(b) v(a)]    11 + e 
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where  = ln  (a; b) = (b; a) and the derivative of
1
1 + ex
has module bounded above by 1=4. 
Proposition 27 Let v : A ! R and  > 0. The following conditions are equivalent for a function
 : A26= ! ( ; ) such that a;b =  b;a for all a 6= b in A:
1. the incumbent transition matrix M is reversible for every exploration matrix Q;
2. DDM(v; ; ) is transitive;
3. there exists  2 (A) such that, for all a 6= b in A,
 (a; b) =
 (a)
 (a) +  (b)
In this case:
(i)  is the unique fully supported distribution  on A that solves equation
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
= e[v(a) v(b)]   (a)
 (b)
that is,
 (a)
 (b)
=
1  e (a;b+)[v(a) v(b)]
e a;b[v(a) v(b)]   e [v(a) v(b)] (42)
(ii) the stationary distribution of M is
m (a) =
 (a) ev(a)P
b2A 
 (b) ev(b)
8a 2 A
(iii) If   0, then  is the uniform distribution on A and
m (a) =
ev(a)P
b2A e
v(b)
8a 2 A
Moreover, for each fully supported  2 (A), there exists a unique  : A26= ! ( ; ) such that
a;b =  b;a for which DDM(v; ; ) is transitive and such that  = .
Summing up, given neural utility v and threshold , starting bias specications  of transitive DDMs
bijectively correspond to fully supported initial distributions  on A. These distributions in turn charac-
terize the (softmax) stationary distribution of the resulting Metropolis-DDM algorithms (irrespective of
the exploration parameters  and Q).
Proof of Proposition 27 Since  : A26= ! ( ; ) is such that a;b =  b;a, then, given any a 6= b in A,
 by Fact 1, P (a; b) 2 (0; 1);
 by Fact 2, P (a; b) = 1  P (b; a).
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If moreover DDM(v; ; ) is transitive, then
P (b; a)P (c; b)P (a; c) = P (c; a)P (b; c)P (a; b)
for all distinct a; b; c 2 A. By Luce and Suppes (1965, Theorem 48, p. 350), there exists v : A ! R such
that
P (a; b) = P (COa;b = a) =
ev(a)
ev(a) + ev(b)
(43)
for all a 6= b in A. Dene
 (a) = v (a)  v (a) 8a 2 A
so that v = v + . Notice that  is unique up to location because v is.
With this, the explicit form of M is
M (a j b) =
8>><>>:
Q (a j b) e
v(a)
ev(a) + ev(b)
if a 6= b
1 Pc2AnfbgQ (c j b) ev(a)ev(c) + ev(b) if a = b
and so M is irreducible for every irreducible Q. Moreover, again by the irreducibility of Q,X
c2Anfbg
Q (c j b) > 0 8b 2 A
Otherwise it would follow Q (b j b) = 1 for some b 2 A, violating irreducibility. But, then M (b j b) > 0
for all b 2 A, which implies aperiodicity of M . Thus M admits a unique stationary distribution (see, e.g.,
Madras, 2002, Theorem 4.2, p. 35).
Next we show that the stationary distribution is
m (a) =
ev(a)+(a)P
b2A e
v(b)+(b)
=
ev(a)P
b2A e
v(b)
8a 2 A
Notice that, for all a 6= b in A,
M (a j b)m (b) = Q (a j b) e
v(a)
ev(a) + ev(b)
ev(b)P
x2A e
v(x)
=
Q (a j b)P
x2A e
v(x)
ev(a)+v(b)
ev(a) + ev(b)
= Q (b j a) e
v(b)
ev(b) + ev(a)
ev(a)P
x2A e
v(x)
=M (b j a)m (a)
If a = b, then M (a j b)m (b) =M (b j a)m (a) is obvious, thus
M (a j b)m (b) =M (b j a)m (a) 8a; b 2 A
Therefore, M is reversible with respect to m and a fortiori m is stationary forM (see, e.g., Madras, 2002,
Proposition 4.4, p. 36).
So far we have proved that point 2 implies point 1 and that, under point 2, irrespective of  and Q,
the stationary distribution of M is
m (a) =
ev(a)+(a)P
b2A e
v(b)+(b)
=
ev(a)P
b2A e
v(b)
8a 2 A
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Now assume point 1 holds. By taking Q (x j y) = 1= jAj for all x; y 2 A, we have that the matrix
M (a j b) = 1jAjP
 (a; b) 8 (a; b) 2 A26=
is reversible with respect to some m 2 (A), that is
1
jAjP
 (a; b) m (b) =
1
jAjP
 (b; a) m (a) 8 (a; b) 2 A26=
Since M is irreducible and aperiodic, then m is the unique stationary distribution of M .
If m were not fully supported, say m (a) = 0 for some a 2 A, then it would follow
m (b) =
P (b; a)
P (a; b)
m (a) = 0 8b 6= a
which is absurd. Then, for all a 6= b in A,
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
=
m (a)
m (b)
Set
 (a) =
m (a) e v(a)P
b2A m (b) e
 v(b) 8a 2 A
this distribution is fully supported on A and, for all a 6= b in A,
 (a)
 (b)
=
m (a) e v(a)
m (b) e v(b)
=
e v(a)P (a; b)
e v(b)P (b; a)
=
 (a; b)
 (b; a)
Since  (a; b) +  (b; a) = 1 for all a 6= b, it follows that
 (a; b) =
1
1 + 
(b;a)
(a;b)
=
1
1 + 
(b)
(a)
=
 (a)
 (a) +  (b)
So far we have proved that point 1 implies point 3 and that, under point 1, irrespective of  and with a
uniform Q, there exists a fully supported  2 (A) such that:
 the stationary distribution of M (where the bar recalls that Q is uniform) is given, for all a 2 A, by
m (a) =
m (a)P
b2A m (b)
=
1P
b2A
m(b)
m(a)
=
1P
b2A
m(b)e v(b)ev(b)
m(a)e v(a)ev(a)
=
1P
b2A
(b)ev(b)
(a)ev(a)
=
 (a) ev(a)P
b2A 
 (b) ev(b)
 for all a 6= b in A
 (a)
 (b)
=
 (a; b)
 (b; a)
Now assume point 3 holds, then there exists  2 (A) such that, for all a 6= b in A,
 (a; b) =
 (a)
 (a) +  (b)
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In particular,  is fully supported (because  (a; b) 2 (0; 1) for all a 6= b in A), and for all distinct
alternatives a; b; c 2 A,
P (b; a)P (c; b)P (a; c)
P (c; a)P (b; c)P (a; b)
=
P (b; a)P (c; b)P (a; c)
P (a; b)P (b; c)P (c; a)
=
ev(b)
ev(a)
 (b; a)
 (a; b)
ev(c)
ev(b)
 (c; b)
 (b; c)
ev(a)
ev(c)
 (a; c)
 (c; a)
=
 (b; a)
 (a; b)
 (c; b)
 (b; c)
 (a; c)
 (c; a)
=
 (b)
 (a)
 (c)
 (b)
 (a)
 (c)
= 1
that is, DDM(v; ; ) is transitive.
So far we have shown the equivalence of points 1, 2, and 3. Moreover, if 1 holds and we denote by m
the stationary distribution of M (which is unique because M is aperiodic and irreducible), then m is fully
supported and
 (a) =
m (a) e v(a)P
b2A m (b) e
 v(b)
is such that
m (a) =
 (a) ev(a)P
b2A 
 (b) ev(b)
(44)
but since also point 2 holds, all stationary distributions of all M = M (;Q) coincide (irrespective of 
and Q) and are given by (44) and (ii) holds. Moreover, for all a 6= b in A,
 (a)
 (b)
=
 (a; b)
 (b; a)
= e [v(a) v(b)]
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
and so  is a fully supported probability  on A that solves the equation
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
= e[v(a) v(b)]   (a)
 (b)
for all a 6= b in A. At the same time such solution is unique because fully supported probability measures
on A are uniquely determined by their odds. Thus (ii) holds.
Moreover, if   0, then
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
= e[v(a) v(b)]
thus DDM(v; ;0) is transitive and 0 is uniform. This proves the rst part of (iii). To prove the second
part, we will show that, for each fully supported  in(A), there exists one and only one  : A26= ! ( ; )
such that a;b =  b;a for which DDM(v; ; ) is transitive and such that  = .
Assume that  =  = . Then for all a 6= b in A,
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
= e[v(a) v(b)]  
 (a)
 (b)
= e[v(a) v(b)]  
 (a)
 (b)
=
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
and by (39)
 (a; b) =   + 1
v (a)  v (b) ln
(a)
(b)
e[v(a) v(b)] + 1
(a)
(b)
e [v(a) v(b)] + 1
=  (a; b)
so that  = . This proves that  7!  from the set of all  : A26= ! ( ; ) such that a;b =  b;a for
which DDM(v; ; ) is transitive to the set of all fully supported probabilities on A is injective.
As to surjectivity, set
 (a; b) =   + 1
v (a)  v (b) ln
(a)
(b)
e[v(a) v(b)] + 1
(a)
(b)
e [v(a) v(b)] + 1
64
if v (a) 6= v (b) and  (a; b) =   + 2 (a) = ( (a) +  (b)) otherwise. Tedious verication shows that
 : A26= ! ( ; ) is such that a;b =  b;a and
P (a; b)
P (b; a)
= e[v(a) v(b)]   (a)
 (b)
for all a 6= b in A, and so DDM(v; ; ) is transitive and  = , as wanted. 
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